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THE PATIENT LIFE:
CAN CONSUMERS
DIRECT HEALTH CARE?
CARLE. SCHNEIDERt &MARKA. HALLtt

Then said Evangelist, ''If this be thy condition, why standest thou still?"
He answered, "Because I know not whither to go."
John Bunyan

The Pilgrim's Progress

ABSTRACT

The ultimate aim of health care policy is good care at good prices.
Managed care failed to achieve this goal through influencing providers, so
health policy has turned to the only market-based option left: treating patients
like consumers. Health insurance and tax policy now pressure patients to
spend their own money when they select health plans, providers, and
treatments. Expecting patients to choose what they need at the price they
want, consumerists believe that market competition will constrain costs while
optimizing quality. This classic form of consumerism is today's health policy
watchword.
This article evaluates consumerism and the regulatory mechanism of
which it is essentially an example - legally mandated disclosure of
information. We do so by assessing the crucial assumptions about human
nature on which consumerism and mandated disclosure depend.
Consumerism operates in a variety of contexts in a variety of ways with a
variety of aims. To assess so protean a thing, we ask what a patient's life
would really be like in a consumerist world. The literature abounds in
Chauncey Stillman Professor of Law & Professor of Internal Medicine, University of
Michigan. We are truly grateful for support from a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Investigator Award in Health Policy Research.
tt
Fred D. & Elizabeth L. Turnage Professor of Law & Public Health, Wake Forest
University.
For the reasons given in Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U Chicago L
Rev 1343 (1986), we renounce the iniquitous Bluebook and all its works. Instead we follow the
University of Chicago Manual ofLegal Citation.
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theories about how medical consumers should behave. We look for empirical
evidence about how real people actually buy health plans, choose providers,
and select treatments.
We conclude that consumerism, and thus mandated disclosure generally,
are unlikely to accomplish the goals imagined for them. Consumerism's
prerequisites are too many and too demanding. First, consumers must have
choices that include the coverage, care-takers, and care they want. Second,
Third,
reliable information about those choices must be available.
information must be put bifore consumers, especially by doctors. Fourth,
consumers must receive the information. Fifth, the information must be
. complete and comprehensible enough for consumers to use it. Sixth, consumers
must understand what they are told. Seventh, consumers must be willing to
analyze the information. Eighth, consumers must actually analyze the
information and do so well enough to make good choices.
Our review of the empirical evidence concludes that these prerequisites
cannot be met reliably most of the time. At every stage people encounter
daunting hurdles. Like so many other dreams of controlling costs and giving
patients control, consumerism is doomed to disappoint. This does not mean
that consumerist tools should never be used. It means they should not be used
unadvisedly or lightly, but discreetly, advisedly, soberly, and in the fear of
error.
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE CLATIERING TRAIN

Who is in charge of the clattering train?
The axles creak and the couplings strain,
And the pace is hot and the points are near,
And sleep hath deadened the driver's ear,
And the signals flash through the night in vain,
For Death is in charge of the clattering train.
Anonymous
The United States spends too much for the health care it receives. Yearly,
the problem worsens. 1 More of the GDP (16%) goes to health care than in any
comparable country without buying appreciably superior health. Medical
goods and services cost more than in similar countries. 2 Their prices rise
faster than inflation. And perhaps "more than 25 percent of all health care
spending is either entirely unnecessary or is of only questionable or marginal
benefit. "3 Who is in charge of this clattering train?
Everyone wants the train subdued. Governments worry because they pay
for so many people's care. Employers worry because the more they pay for
insurance the less they can pay in wages. Employees worry because they
defray ever larger shares of medical costs. We all should worry because while
Clark C. Havighurst and Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American

Health Care, 69 L & Contemp Prob 7, 11 (2006).
2

Id at 13.
Mark A. Hall, Making Medical Spending Decisions: The Law, Ethics €5 Economics of
Rationing Mechanisms 21 (Oxford, 1997).
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insurance appears to insulate us, ultimately we pay - as taxpayers, as
employees, as consumers - for what we receive. And even while we worry
about costs, we worry also about quality. Controlling the train means
reducing costs while improving quality.
A. CONTROLLING COSTS AND QUALITY

Lawmakers, employers, health plans, and hospitals have long tried to stop
the clattering train. But costs rise irrepressibly because irrepressible forces
push them. Technology, for example, can be marvelous, but it can also be
costly. 4 And specialization combines with technology to require expensively
bureaucratized medicine.
The financial structure of medical care also accelerates costs. Doctors and
hospitals commonly charge fees for services. The more services, the more
fees; the higher the fees, the higher the income. Doctors decide what patients
need. Doctors are professionals, and "commercial" practices are undignified
and displease professional associations, so historically, "[p]rice competition
was disavowed as unbefitting a learned profession and as inappropriate for a
vital service."5 Thus "medical professionalism created a spiral of expanding
capacity, technology, utilization, and cost.
Fee-for-service payment to
physicians and cost-based reimbursement to hospitals rewarded extensive and
complex care. Physicians recommended more visits, more tests, and more
procedures."6 So even early in the twentieth century, costs climbed. 7
The clattering train was once slowed by want of fuel. When shallowpocketed individuals paid, costs could only go so high. Then came the deep
pockets. Employers (stimulated by tax incentives) insured employees.
Government (stimulated by social duty) insured the old and the poor.
Insurers paid "usual and customary" rates - essentially, what doctors and
hospitals charged. Thus fueled, the train sped up. Robinson puts it neatly:

4
Economists generally agree that the "principal factor by far [in rising costs] is
medical innovations like new drugs, new surgical procedures and new diagnostic techniques."
Gina Kolata, A Conversation with Victor Fuchs: An Economist's View of Health Care Reform,
New York Times F6 (May 2, 2000).
5
James C. Robinson, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: Competition and
Innovation in Health Care 21 (Berkeley, 1999).
6
Id at 23.
Committee on Costs of Medicare, Medical Care for the American People (Chicago,
1932).
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Physicians and hospitals were motivated to provide ever more
and better services, since higher costs generated higher revenues.
Patients were motivated to demand more and better services
since the costs were shifted onto insurers and thence to
employers and taxpayers. Employers were motivated to expand
the breadth and generosity of insured benefits to capture the tax
subsidy. Medicare and Medicaid viewed their covered services as
a statutory entitlement for beneficiaries . . . and were eager to
accommodate physician interests so as to mitigate the traditional
hostility of organized medicine. Everyone was saying yes and no
one was saying no to the expansion of utilization, specialization,
and expenditure. 8
So the train rattled along briskly. But perhaps costs were justified by the
quality of care? Alas, doctors were presumptively the only qualified judges,
and the "profession systematically refused to discuss or divulge quality
concerns to nonphysicians."9 However, unsettling hints abound. For
example, hospitalization and surgery rates have "varied widely across
geographic regions, with the best predictor being the number of hospital beds
and practicing physicians; the prevalence of disease was not consistently
associated with the frequency and intensity of care."10 And "[r]esearch
studies, authoritative entities such as the Institute of Medicine (IOM), and the
insurers' own claims data reveal widespread overuse, underuse, and misuse of
services, compared with evidence-based norms and clinical guidelines. "11
Employers and governments particularly have labored to slow the train.
Their best success has been managed care. It wants for patients what
consumers shop for- low prices and high quality. It assumes that providers
drive the clattering train and that they can be persuaded to slow, steer, and
stop it. Managed care stems costs by limiting patients' choice of providers and
treatments and by inducing providers to economize. Inducements have
included "oversight and report-card keeping on physicians' prescribing
practices, rules about the use of primary care physicians as gatekeepers or
their elimination altogether . . . evidence-based medicine . . . and
requirements that doctors gain permission for expensive procedures. "12
Managed care has had successes in controlling costs, but it has been
savaged by patients who felt they were losing control of their medical care and
by doctors who felt they were losing control of their work.13 So while managed
care's success has been limited, managed care may not have failed; it was from
its mother's womb untimely ripped.

Robinson, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: Competition and Innovation in
Health Care at 23 (cited in note 5).
9
Id at 28.
10
Id at 24.
11
James C. Robinson and Jill M. Yegian, Medical Management After Managed Care,
Health Affairs W4-269, W4-269-W4-270 (2004 - Web Exclusive), online at
http:/ fcontent.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.269vl.pdf (visited Feb 9, 2009).
12
Daniel Callahan and Angela A. Wasunna, Medicine and the Market: Equity v. Choice
49 - 50 (Johns Hopkins, 2006).
13
Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J Health
Politics, Policy & L 427 (2005).

,,
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Managed care seeks good care at good prices by influencing providers.
Many of its practices survive in some form, but the top-down, supply-side
principle has been pummeled. That left a bottom-up, demand-side principle:
Why not treat patients like consumers? Won't they select the care they need
at the price they want? Won't the market spur competition that expands
consumers' choices while constraining costs? This "consumerism" is today's
watchword. 14 As two writers said fifteen years ago, "[I]fwe want to solve the
nation's health care crisis, we must apply the same commonsense principles to
medical care that we apply to other goods and services. "15 As the former HHS
Secretary said last year, "We have a better option, to provide beneficiaries with
reliable information about the cost and quality of their care. When given that
kind of information, we know that consumers will make decisions that drive
costs down and the quality up. "16
B. CRESCENDOING CONSUMERISM
Consumers search for goods and services of high quality at low prices.
Crucial among services is medical care, but few people shop for it like
consumers, if only because of insurance. 17 This is pleasant, but the dismal
science warns us that when consumers want the best and ignore price, costs
soar like the lark ascending. And when providers bill for each service, prices
soar, well, like the hawk ascending.
Of course, patients have been buying medical services for years. Managed
care actually accelerated the movement toward consumerism and
competition, if only by hastening the organization of doctors and hospitals
into groups that competed for patients. Thus Professor Sage could write years
ago, "The last two decades have witnessed an extraordinary shift toward
reliance on competitive forces to reshape the American health care system,
which previously had been characterized by professional decisionmaking,
consumer deference, and price-insensitive insurance payment.ms
14
"It is clear that a consumer-driven revolution has begun, and there is reason to
believe that it will shape the future direction of the health care system." Jill Quadagno, Who
Wins? Who Loses? Who Pays?, 27 Health Affairs 294, 295 (2008). For especially intelligent
treatments of consumerism, see Clark Havighurst's oeuvre. For his witty introduction to his
own work, see Clark C. Havighurst, I've Seen Enough! My Life and Times in Health Care Law
and Policy, 14 Health Matrix 107 (2004). An excellent and recent survey is Timothy Stoltzfus
Jost, Health Care at Risk: A Critique of the Consumer-Driven Movement (Duke, 2007).
Several book reviews provide an efficient (and sufficient?) introduction to consumerist
writing. See Clark C. Havighurst, Healthy Competition: What's Holding Back Health Care and
How To Free It, 25 Health Affairs 1740 (2006); Alan Maynard, Who Killed Health Care?
America's $2 Trillion Medical Problem - and the Consumer-Driven Cure, 26 Health Affairs
1783 (2007); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Health Care Reform Now!: A Prescription for Change, 27
Health Affairs 291 (2008).
15
John C. Goodman and Gerald L. Musgrave, Patient Power: The Free-Enterprise
Alternative to Clinton's Health Plan vii (Cato Institute, 1994).
16
Robert Pear, Bush Proposes Linking the Medicare Drug Premium to Benificiaries'
Income, NY Times (Feb 16, 2008) (quoting Michael Levitt), online at
http:/ fwww.nytimes.com/2008/02/16/washington/16health.html.
17
Mark A. Hall, The Legal and Historical Foundations of Patients as Medical
Consumers, 96 Geo L J 583 (2008).
18
William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American
Health Care, 99 Colum L Rev 1701 (1999). "The fundamental idea underlying the theory of
managed care was to achieve social equity through the distribution of vouchers ... that could
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In any case, patients now make more purchasing decisions, and more
consumerist proposals are aborning. These proposals vary, 19 but they use
similar methods, make similar assumptions, and raise similar questions. We
therefore evaluate consumerism through an ideal type. In this ideal type,
consumers make three principal purchases. First, they choose their health
care plan. Like good consumers, they decide which plan best suits their wants
and purses. As consumers buy plans, competition for their custom generates
splendid plans at sensible prices.
Second, consumerism expects patients to choose doctors, hospitals, and
other providers considering both quality and cost. Consumerist patients ask:
Which providers offer inexpensive services? Which providers work with
patients to control expenditures? Which providers treat patients decently?
Which providers are competent - or truly excellent? Here, again, consumers
already make some such choices - they may choose doctors, for instance. 20
Third, consumerist patients buy tests and treatments. 21 In its strong form,
consumerism has people spend their "own" money, not "insurance" money, to
buy treatments, and hence patients choose thriftily. Few people can afford all
the treatment they might need, so consumerism assumes insurance would pay
"catastrophic" costs (that is, consumers get insurance with high deductibles).
Most people can't afford high deductibles either; they teeter too close to
the economic brink to find thousands of dollars in their pockets. 22 So the tax
code now lets employers create tax-sheltered "health-savings accounts" in
which unspent funds accumulate from year to year. To qualify for the tax
shelter, deductibles must range (currently) from $1,150 for individuals to
$11,600 for families. 23 Typically, employers put much of the deductible into
the employees' account. Nevertheless, consumers spend their own money in
several senses. First, they contribute to the account. Second, the employer's
contribution is effectively part of the employee's salary. Third, consumers can
use unspent money that accumulates (tax-free) for most health care expenses
and can distribute it in their estates.

be used only for the purchase of health insurance offered by a variety of private, competing
health insurance plans." Uwe E. Reinhardt, Can Efficiency in Health Care Be Left to the
Market?, 26 J Health Politics, Policy & L 967, 985 (2001).
19
Perhaps the most popular of the labels, "consumer-directed health care," is "so
widely used that many different concepts masquerade under its banner .... " Len M. Nichols,
et al, Are Market Forces Strong Enough to Deliver Efficient Health Care Systems? Confidence Is
Waning, 23 Health Affairs 8, 16 (2004).
2
° For evidence that people shop for doctors more than one might suppose, see Carl E.
Schneider, The Practice ofAutonomy: Patients, Doctors, and Medical Decisions (Oxford, 1998).
21
To avoid grating repetition of "test or treatment," we normally use "treatment" to
include "test."
22
See Mark A. Hall and Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts,
and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 Mich L Rev 643 (2008).
23
US Dept Treasury, Treasury, IRS Issue 2009 Indexed Amounts for Health Savings
Accounts, online at http:/ fwww.treas.gov/pressfreleases/hp975.htm (visited Mar 21, 2009).
Seventy percent of the people with family coverage in a consumerist plan had "a family
deductible of $2,000 to $4,999; 29 percent reported a deductible of at least $5,000." Paul
Fronstin and Sara R. Collins, Findings from the 2007 EBRI/Commonwealth Fund
Consumerism in Health Survey, 315 EBRI Issue Brief 1, 9 (2008), online at
http:/ fwww.commonwealthfund.org/publications/publications_show.htm?doc_id=673661
(visited Feb 9, 2009).
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Parts of the consumerist agenda are already operating. Many insurers
have adopted consumerist devices. "Deductibles are increasing, copayments
for physician office visits and prescription drugs are increasing, and health
plans are increasingly more likely to provide incentives for beneficiaries to use
generic drugs and/ or mail order pharmacy services, and other forms of tiered
benefits .... "24 Already, "40% of primary care physicians are providing care
to CDHP enrollees," and this "may be an underestimate because it does not
account for those physicians who are unaware of their patients' CDHP
coverage."25 In addition, "[t]his policy approach has been strongly adopted in
the Medicare program, where older adults typically face choices among 50 or
more prescription drug plans as well managed care options. "26
So surely consumerism's time is come. Not only are its three parts old
hat; both sides of the ideological spectrum can like it. The right can like using
markets to tame prices and ensure quality. Consumerism simultaneously fits
neatly with the standard principle of the leftish ''bioethics" side of health law:
Offering patients control over their medical care is thefons et origo, the alpha
and omega of bioethical law. 27 That law works mainly through mandated
disclosure - by requiring patients be given good enough information to make
their own decisions. 28 The paramount example is informed consent, but it is
only one of many programs that - like consumerism - aspire to "empower"
patients by giving them information and thus the power to choose what they
want. 29
C. CONSIDERING CONSUMERISM
This article undertakes three enterprises. First, consumerism is the latest
of many battered attempts to control costs while optimizing care. Will it
work? Will it quiet the clattering train? Our second enterprise is evaluating
the regulatory mechanism of which consumerism is an example - legally
mandated disclosure of information so that one party to a transaction can
make good decisions.
Our third enterprise is assessing the crucial
assumptions about human nature on which consumerism and mandated
disclosure depend.
The consumerist agenda provokes deja vu all over again. Many plans
have been laid to tame costs, improve quality, and expand control. Taming
costs fails with doleful regularity. Improving quality is horribly hard. And the
24

Id at 4.
Giridhar Mallya, et al, Are Primary Care Physician Ready to Practice in a ConsumerDriven Environment?, 14 Am J Managed Care 661, 665 (2008).
26
Jessica Greene, et al, Comprehension and Choice of a Consumer-Directed Health
Plan: An Experimental Study, 14 Am J Managed Care 369, 374 (2008).
27
Marsha Garrison and Carl E. Schneider, The Law of Bioethics: Individual Autonomy
and Social Regulation 27-467 (West, 2003).
28
William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American
Health Care, 99 Columbia L Rev 1701 (1999).
29
For example, the Patient Self-Determination Act seeks to encourage patients to use
advance directives to make "pre-need" decisions lest incompetence should prevent them from
exercising their authority. 42 USC § 1395cc(a) (2008). The PSDA requires that patients be
given information about advance directives. HIPAA regulations seek to permit patients to
protect the confidentiality of medical information about them. 45 CFR Parts 160, 162, 164
(2009). The regulations require doctors and hospitals to give patients the information they
need to manage the handling of confidential information.
25
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principal legal attempts to give patients more control routinely disappoint. 30
When plausible policies repeatedly fail to achieve excellent goals despite
exceptional efforts, there are usually high, and sometimes insuperable,
barriers to reaching the goals. Is it thus with consumerism?
Consumerism operates in a variety of contexts in a variety of ways with a
variety of aims; its success thus depends on a variety of things and must be
variously measured. All this variety is inevitable, if only because consumerism
cannot simply be ordained. Rather, the federal government has used tax
policy, its influence as an insurer, and its power as an employer to promote
consumerism and all that may still be too little. Nor have commentators
agreed on what consumerism is and how it should work. So "consumerism" in
health care is various both in action and in books, and it has been defended
and attacked in various ways.
To assess this Proteus, 31 we scrutinize consumerism's distinctive and
crucial feature: purchasers choosing well. We use a fresh technique - we
systematically ask what prerequisites must be met for consumerism to succeed
and whether they will be met. Our answers rest on empirical evidence about
how people buy health plans, choose providers, and select treatments. When
there is no such evidence, we consult empirical research on comparable
decisions.
More specifically, we ask what a consumer's life would really be like in a
consumerist world. What would the human experience of consumerism
actually be? Would people behave as required? The literature abounds in
theories about how these medical consumers should behave. We look for
evidence.
This brings us to our article's second enterprise. One ofthe law's favorite
devices is to require a more knowledgeable (and thus presumptively stronger)
party to provide information to a less knowledgeable (and thus weaker)
party. 32 Securities laws are an ambitious example. Courts and commentators
debate what disclosures should be required in boilerplate contracts. Product
liability law invites manufacturers to disclose dangers their goods pose.
Credit card companies must reveal their terms to card users. Truth-inlending acts are supposed to make borrowers good judges of lending terms.
Miranda warnings give suspects information to use in dealing with police.
And there are hundreds of other examples.
Mandated disclosure and consumerism operate similarly. Their success
depends on how well information can be assembled, disclosed, received,
understood, analyzed, and used. This is why research on mandated disclosure
30

For examples, see Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 Wake Forest L Rev 411

(2006).
31
A complete evaluation would be broad. At the least, it would ask economic questions
like: Isn't much of our health care dollar spent on a small group of people whose care is so
expensive that deductibles are irrelevant? Are health care costs driven by forces - like
technology and the institutions of health care - that consumers can little affect? For an
excellent survey of the issues, see Jost, Health Care at Risk (cited in note 14).
32
As we write, CNN tells us to "take heart, there may be more legislation ... on the
way. Last month New Jersey became the first state to enact a law that requires [matchmaking websites] to disclose whether they do background checks on members." Jen Haley, Be
a Savvy Consumer When Looking for Love Online, CNN.com, online at
http:/ fwww.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/personal/02/14/roym.online.dating/index.html (visited
Feb 10, 2009).

THE PATIENT LIFE

15

helps us understand consumerism, and why our technique for studying
consumerism helps us evaluate mandated disclosure as a regulatory method.
So to our third enterprise. We conclude that consumerism, and thus
mandated disclosure generally, are unlikely to accomplish the goals imagined
for them. Consumerism's prerequisites are too many and too exigent.
Consumers make many purchases with aplomb. Most things consumers
acquire they buy regularly and judge easily. Those products are sold in
national markets in which competition works its Smithian magic. But health
plans, providers, and treatments are chosen sporadically, are hard to assess
even after the purchase, and are often sold in small and stodgy markets. So
health care choices are harshly more demanding than most other purchases,
as Kenneth Arrow famously said long ago. 33
Consumerism and mandated disclosure, then, rest on suppositions about
how people respond to incentives to buy unfamiliar products wisely. They
rest, that is, on assumptions about human nature. Those assumptions are
generally unexamined and generally misleading.
They fundamentally
misunderstand human nature. First, they misunderstand how people make
decisions and over-estimate their willingness and ability to do so. Second,
they misunderstand how people want to lead their lives; they forget that
people have better things to do than becoming model consumers.
Our review of how people in a consumerist world would choose health
plans, providers, and treatments, then, concludes that at every stage people
would encounter daunting hurdles. Like so many dreams of controlling costs
and giving patients control, consumerism is doomed to disappoint. This does
not mean that consumerist tools should never be used. It means they should
not be used unadvisedly or lightly, but discreetly, advisedly, soberly, and in the
fear of error.
II. THE AVAILABILIIT OF GOOD CHOICES

Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the Shadow
T. S. Eliot
The Hollow Men
We now begin our project of evaluating consumerism by systematically
reviewing its prerequisites. The first prerequisite is that consumers need
alternatives adequate to the variety of purchasers and circumstances for each
purchase: plans, providers, and treatments. Will this happen? Sometimes
somewhat, but often little.

33
Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am
Economic Rev 941 (1963).
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A. THRIFIY HEALTH PLANS

Some prominent consumerists - Havighurst is a distinguished example propose that costs may be moderated and patients may better match their
expenditures to their preferences if they can purchase health insurance the
way they purchase other services. The consumerist agenda will thus wither if
consumers lack adequate choices. Yet many consumers have no such options
and faint prospect of getting them.
Many people "have no real or perceived choice in their employment,
health insurance, or health plan."34 Even larger employers in larger cities may
offer employees only a few choices, and few employers offer many. For
example, "in 1999 approximately half of individuals covered by employersponsored plans had no choice or limited choice of health plans."35 And
"Robert Berenson . . . contends that 'only a few large and prominent
employers are redesigning employer contribution formulas to encourage value
purchasing, contracting directly with provider-based delivery systems, or
using quality data ... in any meaningful way to select plans.'" Medium-sized
employers '"do not even seem to understand the difference between the price
of particular provider services and their aggregate cost ... , much less to be
able to separate fact from fiction on quality measures.'"36
Even consumers offered several plans may have scanty choices. This
insurance comes in prix fixe packages; you can't choose a la carte. But you
will rarely be offered the meal you want. Buying insurance is not (to change
the metaphor) like buying a car, where you can take a showroom model or
design your own farrago of options. Insurers cannot afford to let people buy
only coverage they know they will need. Nor must competition inspire
variety; on the contrary, competitors may converge around packages likeliest
to attract buyers.
Employers might even dislike long a la carte menus. Employers don't
want under-insured and hence under-treated, bankrupt, and bitter employees.
The more options consumers have, the likelier they are to choose
improvidently, and pressure to economize drives employees toward underinsurance. Under-insurance matters, especially since the distance between
lavish and stingy is wide. Under-insurance can wreck financial and physical
health. Costs of illness (particularly medical bills and loss of income)
contribute to more than half of personal bankruptcies. 37 And even shaving
back coverage can hurt.
One longitudinal study, for example,
"demonstrate[d] significantly worse health outcomes among individuals who
reported restricting their use of prescription medications because of cost....
[C]ost-related medication restriction was associated with almost twice the
34
Amy B. Bernstein and Anne K. Gauthier, Choices in Health Care: What Are They and
What Are They Worth?, 56 Med Care Res & Rev 5, 11 (1999).
35
Peter D. Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A Policy Whodunit, 47 SLU L Rev
365, 375 (2003).
36
Lawrence D. Brown, Management by Objection?: Public Policies to Protect Choice in
Health Plans, 56 Med Care Res & Rev 145, 157 (1999).
37
See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient Revisited, 51 SLU L Rev 307
(2007); Melissa B. Jacoby and Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An
Alternative Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 Nw U L Rev 535, 538-539
(2006); R.W. Seifert and M. Rukavina, Bankruptcy Is the Tip of a Medical-Debt Iceberg, 25
Health Affairs w89 (2006- Web Exclusive).
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odds of experiencing a significant decline in overall health over 2 years of
follow up."38
In short, health plans do not now meet consumerism's first prerequisite adequate choice. Nor can they without restructuring health care financing in
large, unlikely, and possibly unwise ways.
B. THRIF'IY TREATMENT CHOICES
Consumerism promises to fix the clattering train by pressuring patients to
"take a more active interest than they hitherto have had in the costeffectiveness of their care. "39 Patients spending their own money should buy
treatments cheaply and eschew wasteful care. But will patients have scope to
economize on treatments? Not if no savings are practically possible or if
reforms have already eliminated excess expenditures. Nor need patients
So, how much
economize if they will exceed the year's deductible.
opportunity and incentive to save will patients have?
This question has two parts. First, are there substantial unexploited
opportunities for economies? After all, "health care plans today already
contain both substantial cost sharing and managed care measures that are
likely to reduce spending."40 Second, will consumerism induce patients to
exploit any such opportunities?
Consumerism's easiest case is where equally effective treatments differ in
cost. The classic example is generic drugs. Since by hypothesis the drugs are
identical, the cheap treatment is so plainly preferable that doctors hardly need
offer patients a choice. In these areas it's not clear how much room for
improvement is left and whether referring decisions to patients helps. After
all, managed care has campaigned for years to get doctors to substitute
generics for brand-name drugs, and health plans increasingly use formularies
to get doctors to prefer cheap to expensive drugs. 41 These efforts and a
changing medical culture have helped. For example, as early as ten years ago
"[o]nly So/o of physicians preferred brand-name medications over generic
drugs regardless of cost. "42 Similarly, patients who use emergency rooms or
specialists for routine problems notoriously waste resources, but health plans
have already attacked this problem by increasing copayments for ERs and by
requiring referrals to specialists.
Another easy case for consumerism is where patients decide whether a
genuinely elective treatment is worth paying for. This category's borders are
hazy, but some decisions, like cosmetic surgery, fit it neatly enough. But how
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much can consumerism save here, since patients already pay for most such
treatments?
Consumerists' remaining core case is an optimal treatment and a cheaper
sub-optimal treatment. At one extreme, the efficacy gap is so small and the
cost gap so great that consumer choice is hardly needed to reach the
economical result. At the other extreme, the efficacy gap is so great and the
ailment so severe that the cheaper treatment seems hardly better than no
treatment. Are there enough cases between these extremes to permit
substantial savings?
Two cases may exemplify this category. The patient has an upper
respiratory tract infection and acute sinusitis. A cheaper antibiotic works
70% of the time, a costlier one 80% and about a day faster. The consumerist
patient weighs "the increased cost and potential side effects against the
possibly quicker return to health." A "day of lost work may be more costly to
her, in money or in other ways, than the additional cost of the more expensive
antibiotic."43 Another example: In Pegram, 44 the plan delayed a test that
could have revealed the patient's appendicitis. Delay was probably costeffective for the patient population, but an individual patient might want to
pay extra for peace of mind or to avoid coping with a burst appendix. 45
Tests are a common example in this category. They can be expensive (e.g.,
MRis), and any test might be unnecessary (if the diagnosis is clear, tests are
pointless). Furthermore, while tests are expensive, their costs usually fall
within a high deductible, so that the patient might bear the cost. For example,
some causes of back pain can be detected through an MRI, but those are
unusual and not urgent problems. So it makes economic sense to treat the
likelier causes and use an MRI only if that fails. But an anxious patient might
think the test worth the cost.
In yet another consumerist category, patients need a treatment but can't
afford it. This is a category many doctors know well and the category likeliest
to expand with thorough-going consumerism. Preventing needed care is
presumably not consumerism's goal. Who wants more arbitrary, inequitable,
and inefficient rationing? Faced with such cases, doctors often become social
workers, scrambling to help patients jury-rig treatments. This helps patients,
but it misuses doctors' skills.
In sum, for consumerism to subdue costs, patients will need chances to
economize. We have now asked how much choice will be available and how
much scope for savings patients will have. The short answer is some of each,
but not a lot of either.
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III. THE AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION

As to Holmes, I observed that he satfrequentlyfor halfan hour on end,
with knitted brows and an abstracted air, but he swept the matter
away with a wave of his hand when I mentioned it. ''Data! data!
data!" he cried impatiently. "I can't make bricks without clay."
Arthur Conan Doyle
TheAdventure ofthe Copper Beeches
Now suppose away the problems we've discussed. Consumers have
enough choices of plans, providers, and treatments to suit their wants and
their wallets. They next need information. They need to know what's on offer,
its quality, and its cost. Does this information exist? Will it be forthcoming?
From reliable sources? In brief: sometimes possibly, but not easily often.
A. DOES THE INFORMATION EXIST?
Nobody can be told what nobody knows. Much information consumers
need for choosing plans or providers cannot practically be compiled, would
not willingly be compiled, or has not been worth compiling. Consumers get
much less information than they need. Reinhardt is blunt: "Only rarely, in a
few locations, do American patients have access to even a rudimentary version
of the information infrastructure on which the theory of competitive market
and the theory of managed care rest."46 Nor is managed care's experience
inspiring. Organizations had every incentive to explain themselves. Yet they
offered "patients a bewildering array of acronyms and concepts that even
specialists sometimes have trouble characterizing" while doing "little to
explain the concept" of managed care. 47
Might patients' demands induce providers to assemble information?
Some, surely. But much information is hard to compile in a practical form.
Take one indispensable datum - what doctors and hospitals charge. Prices
are often unavailable in any form consumers could use to compare plans,
providers, and treatments. They are often unavailable in any form anyone can
readily use. 48
Hospitals' fees, for instance, are listed in a "charge master" - "a
confidential list of charges made by the hospital for all its goods and services."
It "is compiled and maintained by the hospital's chief financial officer on the
hospital's computer system." Fifteen years ago, one hospital's charge master
"contained approximately 295 pages and listed prices for approximately 7,650
items." It was "confidential proprietary information" and "not shown to
anyone other than the officers and employees of the hospital and authorized
consultants." It was adjusted weekly "to reflect current cost data; the
hospital's costs are marked up by a mathematical formula designed to produce
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a targeted amount of profit for the hospital. "49 And today, charge masters may
contain as many as 45,000 items. 5°
Ifyou could get a charge master and if you could understand it, you would
still have to decide which charges to use comparing plans or providers
(recalling that prices change frequently). Even if you knew what illnesses you
would have, you would have to predict the treatments (something even
doctors might not know) as the charge master coded their components. Then
you wouid need similar success with other plans and providers. 51 Even if you
could do all this, would you?
Consumers run a pilot test of consumerism when they buy in vitro
fertilization, cosmetic surgery, and dental crowns. These "[c]onsumers
engage in little price shopping." Most consumers accept other patients'
recommendations or physician referrals in choosing providers of IVF and
rhinoplasty. "For dental crowns, virtually all patients choose to stay with their
regular dentist rather than shop around." Significantly, an "important reason
why shopping takes place so infrequently for these procedures is that accurate
price quotes can only be obtained after undergoing in-person screening
exams, since costs vary according to patient characteristics and medical needs
as assessed by each provider."52
Consumers usually learn best through experience, but experience is a
sorry guide to hospital costs, since even long stays unloose only a drop in the
Niagara of possible charges. Nor can you know how typical your experience is
or what another hospital would charge. Nor will your bill teach you much,
since you can't decipher it. One expert, for example,
examined a hospital bill for a person who was charged more than
$30,000 for an outpatient procedure. Many of the services on
the bill were written in a language that only a coding expert could
understand. One of the items was a "Bairhugger upper body cov,"
with a charge of $77.55. The same hospital bill contained the
following additional items and associated charges: Versed 1
MG/ML 2CC VIA-$11.37; Lactated Ringers 2B2324-$189.00;
Valve IV-$7.15; Pack Custom Cysto-$58.00; Set Tur-$35.35. 53
As the Aged Parent of one of us lamented, "every emergency room we've
ever been in, every hospital stay we've had, particularly since our retirement,
has reduced us to helplessness as far as costs were concerned, choice of
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hospitals, and choice of the physicians who treated us once we were
immured."
In short, prices are so complex and dynamic that information about them
hardly exists. It has not been compiled, cannot easily be compiled, and cannot
be reliably analyzed. No wonder it is little provided. 54 No wonder attempts
have far to go before usable information is readily provided. 55
Quality information is as elusive as price information. Reinhardt gloomily
concludes that "[i]nformation on the quality of care is generally unavailable
or not trustworthy. Not even the infection or complication rates experienced
in hospitals are publicly known."56 One study found that ''[l]ess than onethird of adults in any plan type reported that their health plans provided them
with information on either the quality or the cost of their doctors or their
hospitals .... "57 The scant information on quality in the media or on Internet
sites "typically consists of mysteriously weighted aggregate indexes that
obscure the detailed information patients would need in competitive
market."58 There are only "very limited opportunities to learn about the
health outcomes achieved by particular physicians and hospitals."59 For
example, the Association of State Medical Board Executive Directors offers
"information on physicians' education, malpractice judgments, and
disciplinary histories." One employers' group in the Northwest "publishes a
study of patient satisfaction with medical groups and physician networks"
which "ranks groups and networks on patient satisfaction, ease of getting
referrals, and their records of keeping blood pressure and cholesterol under
control and counseling patients on preventive care."60 This is better than
nothing, but how much health would you wager on such spotty and delphic
data?
Like price information, quality information is wickedly hard to assemble.
Measuring quality is tricky. Many facts that look like evidence of a doctor's
proficiency or a hospital's reliability turn treacherous on examination. Even
mortality rates depend on much besides the quality of care. For instance,
local hospitals often turf patients with ominous prognoses out to tertiary-care
centers. So the Crooked Creek Community Hospital's mortality statistics
could look better than the Cleveland Clinic's even while the former offered
worse care.
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Even experts quarrel about measures of quality. For example, "the
National Committee for Quality Assurance found that the 'average' health
plan provided 61.9 percent of appropriate beta-blocker drugs to patients who
suffered a heart attack. Plans ranged between 15 percent and 100 percent on
this indicator." So far so good. But is "a high favorable score on this count ...
evidence of overall high quality or of a shift of resources to this medical
priority at the expense of others, perhaps those left unmeasured in formal
surveys"?61
There is more. To seek out and interpret quality data, consumers must
realize that quality varies. Many consumers do not. "[R]esearch suggests that
most consumers do not believe clinical quality varies significantly across
doctors, hence the low consumer demand for clinical quality report cards. "62
For example, "[m]any industry observers express concern that LASIK is
regarded as a commodity by some consumers - leading them to shop only on
price - when provider quality, in their opinion, varies considerably." LASIK
may be "relatively simple surgery with low complication rates, but for patients
whose eyes have certain 'problem' characteristics (for example, abnormal
topography, large pupils, thin corneas), quality differences can be critical."63
In short, even the most basic information consumers need to buy these
expensive and vital products - information about cost and quality - is often
inaccessible even to experts. Nor is adequate information readily compiled,
given the obstacles to ascertaining and amassing it, the reluctance of sources
of information to publish it, the Everest of relevant information, and the
uncertainty about which information is actually useful, and how to use it.
Things get no better when we move from choosing plans and providers to
choosing treatments. Even experts often lack good information about
treatments. "Evidence-based medicine" is today's watchword, but there is
decent evidence for only a fraction (albeit a large fraction) of medicine.
Indeed, the great fact about the "information" doctors reason from and
present to patients is its insistent uncertainty. Uncertainty "is clinically
commonplace. "64 Medicine "is engulfed and infiltrated by uncertainty. "65
Physicians practice "in a sea of doubt and uncertainty,"66 so that "judgments
must inevitably be made on the doctor's personal experience of past cases; the
comparison of the present size, sound or feel of something with what is
remembered; and on what a clinician believes to be the problem, based
sometimes on very scanty evidence."67
All this is uncertainty about how to treat patients. But consumerist
patients need still another datum - treatments' cost-effectiveness. This is
61
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even less available than information about efficacy.
Managed care
organizations have been trying to generate and acquire such data for years,
with incomplete success. Can patients inspire something better?
In sum, wise decisions depend on adequate information. In this section,
we have seen that often such information does not exist, has not been
gathered, is kept private, or cannot practically be collected.
B. WHENCE COMETH INFORMATION?
Once more suppose away all the problems we've been considering.
Suppose consumers have real choices of plans, providers, and treatments.
Suppose cost and quality information about plans, providers, and treatments
is offered in useful form. Who will give consumers that information, and how
might the messenger affect the message's availability, quality, and credibility?
Ordinary vendors advertise their wares. Unfortunately the incentives that
inspire advertising also inspire hype. Furthermore, the beauties of our own
work always outshine its flaws. Consumers expect and law tolerates some
sales puffery. So when even scrupulous health plans and providers proclaim
their virtues or relate their results, they accentuate the positive. "[N]o one
denies that marketing agents [of medical plans], eager to boost a plan's
enrollment, their own commissions, or both, sometimes put consumers' minds
at ease by shading facts." 68 But how are consumers to discount for the hype?
Similar problems are inevitable when patients purchase treatments. One
canary in this mine is LASIK surgery, which consumers buy directly from
providers who advertise. "Misleading advertisements have been a recurring
problem with some LASIK providers, most notably discounters; federal and
state regulators have taken action against some providers - and investigated
many more - for making unfounded claims about price and quality. "69
Another canary is direct-to-consumer drug advertising. One study
concludes that these ads "have limited educational value and may oversell the
benefits of drugs in ways that might conflict with promoting population
health. "7o Similarly, Lyles believes that the ''blend of promotion and
information has produced more prescription drug awareness than knowledge
- it has been largely ineffective in educating patients with medical conditions
about the medications for those conditions:•n And not just ineffective in
educating, but mis-educating. Advertisements for drugs are regulated, but
their information ''has frequently been found to be biased or misleading in
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regulatory and academic evaluations. "72 Consumers tested after seeing ads
"correctly answered an average of 59 percent of the true/false questions,"
fewer when the questions were about risk, and fewer "if the information had
been given in text, with or without accompanying audio, rather than in audio
only ...."73
Hospital ads may be yet more vacuous (if blessedly rarer). An analysis of
over 300 hospital websites said that their information was "rudimentary" and
that "few of the designated measures were valid and reliable measures of
quality."74
Even when providers are compelled to disclose information, they can
usually beautifY it. When health plans had to disclose the way their doctors
were paid, "almost none" of their statements mentioned "the potential
negative impact that incentive arrangements might have on physician
behavior." They more often put "incentives in a positive light," by saying, for
example, that the incentives rewarded better care (as perhaps they did). 75
All this makes vendors unreliable, as consumers know. But how
unreliable? Vendors paint pretty portraits, but they also paint some warts,
not least because they want repeat business and good word-of-mouth, neither
of which comes from deceived customers. So how does the consumer
distinguish reliable from dubious vendors? Discount favorable information
from any vendor? Discount it they do. For example, "[s]everal focus groups
have found that consumers particularly distrust information that comes from
the plans themselves, or from their employers because they believe they are
being 'marketed' .... "76 Yet too much discounting is as bad as too little.
Consumers of all kinds are especially moved by recommendations from
friends and family. And so "when it comes to plan choice, consumers say they
most trust the advice of their doctors, friends, and family .... "77 However,
those recommendations are unsystematic, and lay evaluations of technical
services are unreliable. 78 So consumers may trust most those who evaluate
quality worst.
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Ideally, then, consumers need sounder sources. When you buy flooring,
you check Fine Homebuilding. When you buy a handsaw, you check Fine
Woodworking. Will a Fine Health Care appear? Consumer Reports does rate
health plans, US News eJ World Report does rate hospitals, and Internet sites
are arising. 79 But when markets are so fragmented, could Fine Health Care
evaluate each market thoroughly enough? FHC would also struggle with the
complexities we've been describing. Furthermore, the institutions FHC
evaluated would game the system, just as law schools do with U.S. News and
World Report. Anderson, for example, says California has tried to proffer
useful information by comparing "the prices of only twenty-five items on the
chargemaster." However, "hospitals can lower prices for just those twenty-five
items."80
So is a really useful FHC possible? And if so, would consumers
really use it?
Information about everything does bubble up everywhere on the Internet.
But it must be (1) consulted, (2) reliable, and (3) workable: onerous
requirements. For example, people over 75 "were much less likely to report
use of the Internet for health than their juniors."81 And, for example, the best
guide to Medicare drug cards in 2005 was the government's website. But
three quarters of the prospective beneficiaries had never used the Internet,
and "of the 23 percent who had used it, only 6 percent had visited the
website."82
Well, the Luddite old will eventually be replaced by the cyber young. But
they still must locate sites and separate wheat-sites from chaff-sites.
Inevitably, chaff proliferates; studies repeatedly find Internet information
dicey. 83 "[O]nly a few of the web pages" one study reviewed "gave complete
and accurate information for such a common and widely discussed condition
as fever in children." The advice those sites gave parents about children's
fevers was "often incomplete and partly misleading" and inadequate to
overcome parents' ''beliefs and established practices."84
In addition, making Internet information usable is hard. One Medicare
expert tried to help "a parent, who was taking four prescription drugs, use the
[government] website to find the best card." It took "forty-two 'clicks' or word
entries to get an answer." The expert had to supply data "about such things as
each medication used and its dosage, current drug spending, and pharmacy
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preferences."85 Not only is this laborious (and irksome, since entry errors are
almost unavoidable), but who has such facts easy to hand? 86
Even were the Internet widely used, how consumerist would the results
be? "Many have argued that patients using the Web to find providers will
finally bring price-sensitivity to health care consumption . . . . The exact
opposite is more likely to occur . . . . Not only will people never seek the
lowest bidder when it comes to their own physical and emotional well-being;
they will actively seek out and select the highest bidder, presuming (usually
correctly) that higher cost connotes higher quality .... "87 Furthermore, health
care companies advertise because it moves their products, partly by increasing
demand. Increased demand rarely lowers overall health care costs.
Another way to assess the Internet's usefulness is to ask how it helps with
other major choices. Try using the retirement-planning sites of Fidelity,
Vanguard, TI.AA and the like. Their instructions for entering data drip with
ambiguity, their assumptions are unannounced, even a single program gives
wildly different counsel with slight variations in entries, and different sites
give different advice even when you try to keep entries consistent. If
providing information on the Internet were easy, surely these well-motivated
institutions could do better. And if they can't, who can?
In the preceding section, we said that information about health purchases
is often unavailable. In this section, we asked who will deliver the information
that is available. Messengers are generally fewer than in other purchases and
less reliable and harder to evaluate than consumers' usual informants.
IV. WILL DOCTORS DISCUSS AND USE COST INFORMATION?

Should you begin by discussing fees, you will suggest to the patient
either that you will go away and leave him if no agreement be reached,
or that you will neglect him and not prescribe any immediate
treatment .... For I consider such a worry to be harmful to a troubled
patient, particularly if the disease be acute. For the quickness of the
disease, offering no opportunity for turning back, spurs on the good
physician not to seek his profit but rather to lay hold on reputation.
Hippocrates
Precepts
Once again, assume away all the problems we have discussed so far.
Suppose the information consumers need is assembled and is proffered by
trustworthy messengers consumers actually trust. Will doctors and patients
then discuss costs, and will doctors help patients economize?
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A. STIMULATING DISCUSSIONS OF COSTS

Consumerism may seem especially plausible for treatment decisions, since
doctors can help patients make them. Some patients - especially the poor already get cost guidance. But for consumerism to work, doctors must
routinely discuss costs, since otherwise patients cannot identify economies.
So will doctors and patients talk about the cost of treatment choices?
They might. First, patients might take the initiative and ask about cheaper
treatments or foregoing treatment. This happens. It should be encouraged.
But patients often do not realize such a question makes sense. Furthermore,
patients report a "wide variety ofbarriers" to discussing costs. 88 Who wants to
bring up money? Even in an art gallery, embarrassment might inhibit you
from asking about price. Partly this is because you probably can't afford the
Paul Strand you want, just as you might not be able to afford the treatment
the doctor proposes.
Furthermore, you come to the doctor "sick, anxious, and intimidated. So
you let the doctor set the boundaries and tone of your relationship." 89 You
want doctors' approval, confidence, and concern.
Questioning a
recommendation and demanding a cheaper one rarely strike patients as canny
tactics, especially when physicians are selling their own services. Thus in one
study only 12% of the subjects had ever negotiated with a provider for a lower
price. 90 One sophisticated patient we know thought it "a little difficult" to ask
a doctor she had just met about price. She feared raising questions about
"respect" for the doctor and getting "off on the wrong foot." When we said
that "you don't want your doctor thinking badly about you," she replied, "Yeah,
getting revenge somehow, perhaps."91 Further, patients are notoriously bad at
raising the subjects they really want to discuss. Finally, sickness can be
painful, exhausting, debilitating, disorienting, terrifying, isolating. People so
afflicted lack the energy and acuity to ask smart questions and demand smart
answers.
If patients won't reliably bring up cost, will doctors? This is crucial,
because physicians notoriously dominate conversations with patients. 92 Yet
physicians little relish conversations about prices. 93 Indeed, "the literature has
only recently begun to address patient-provider communication about health
care costs." On "first pass, it appears that little communication of this type is
going on. "94 Physicians advertise rarely, advertise fees less, and post no
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prices.95 Dr. Hippocrates, quoted in our epigraph, set the example of
reluctance to talk about money. 96 Stein describes a "taboo in official American
health culture: namely, a prohibition upon allowing the physician to appear
concerned with financial matters." Stein thinks people "'selling' their services
are loathe to affix a price tag to services at the time of the transaction or as an
official precondition to 'delivering' them. Somehow it would be immoral to do
so."97 And perhaps physicians (relatively rich) are embarrassed to reveal fees
patients (relatively poor) may find incomprehensibly high and intolerably
burdensome.
Research confirms that doctors and patients do not regularly discuss
costs. "Four hundred eight patients (85%) reported they had never discussed
their out-of-pocket costs with their physician. This group of 408 patients
included 56 of the 77 patients (73%) who reported cost-related medication
nonadherence during the previous 12 months."98 Likewise, only a tenth of
another group of patients remembered being told what care would cost. 99
Some data look more encouraging. Fronstin and Collins found that
people in consumer plans were likelier to talk with their doctor about
treatment options and costs and to ask their doctor to recommend a cheaper
drug: "[a]bout 2 in 5 said they had done this, compared with thirty percent of
those in more comprehensive plans."100 Nevertheless, these patients were
asked whether they had ever discussed cost, not whether such discussions
were routine and productive.
Even if doctors balk at discussing their own fees, might they discuss the
costs of services and supplies they order from others? Perhaps not. For
instance: "Physician-patient discussions about new medication cost and other
acquisition issues, especially medication affordability, occur infrequently."101
This is true even where discussion seems needed: "Few chronically ill patients
who are at risk of or experiencing problems related to prescription medication
costs report that their clinicians had asked them about possible medication
payment difficulties. "102
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One major problem is that doctors often do not know prices. Half a
century ago doctors were "seldom informed about the price" of drugs. 103 A
quarter of a century ago "doctors seldom ha[d] an accurate sense of drug
costs" and when asked "about common drug prices, they reveal[ed] ignorance
more often than knowledge."104 Today doctors "consistently overestimate[e]
the cost of inexpensive products and underestimate[ e) the cost of expensive
ones."105 Even primary care and internal medicine physicians are "no more
knowledgeable about costs than their family practice, geriatrics, pediatrics,
and neurology colleagues were a decade ago." Eighty percent of them "were
often unaware of actual drug costs, and most underestimated the cost of
common brand-name medications we inquired about."106
Furthermore, physicians cannot know what treatments cost until they
know what treatments are required.
But, for example, primary-care
physicians often forward patients to specialists and hospitals with little idea
what the cost will be. 107 Thus one national survey found primary-care doctors
"unprepared to advise patients on the costs of medical care, particularly
radiologic studies, specialty consultations, and hospitalizations."106
In addition, most doctors have patients with different insurers which
negotiate fees "in a tumultuous market that regards prices as trade secrets.
One Harvard surgeon's group has a six-hundred page 'master fee schedule'
with 'twenty-four columns across the top, one for each of the major insurance
plans, and, running down the side, a row for every service a doctor can bill
for."' Even a "superb office staff might not know who would pay what until
the insurer completed claims 'adjudication.'"109 Yet
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clearing a typical insurance claim involves, for starters, the
following queries: (1) Is the patient a member of the plan?
(2) Is this particular service covered by the patient's benefit plan?
(3) Is there secondary insurance that should cover this service?
( 4) Is this service related to an incident that may be subrogatable
to a workers' comp, disability, or accident event? (5) Is this
service consistent with the patient's clinical diagnosis, history,
age, and sex? (6) Is the service, if covered, medically necessary?
(7) Has the service, if covered, been preauthorized? (8) Is this
submitting provider qualified to provide this service? (9) Is the
provider a member of the network? (10) How much do we pay
this particular provider for this particular service? (11) Has the
patient's deductible or major medical been met this year?
(12) Did the patient pay upfront, and who are we reimbursing,
patient or provider? 110
Can doctors be persuaded to discuss money regularly? Altering doctors'
preferences and practices is hard even where change would benefit patients
clinically.m Most relevantly, managed care organizations have for years
begged doctors to economize in exactly the ways consumerism contemplates.
Those efforts provoked vehement resistance, disappointing improvement, and
numerous retreats by health plans.
Can the law stimulate cost discussions? When the law wants to change
sellers' interactions with consumers, it reaches first for mandated disclosure.
Asked to change doctors' conversations with patients, the law reaches first for
informed consent. But how would informed consent work here? Plaintiffs
would be claiming that, properly informed, they would have foregone a test or
chosen a cheaper treatment. But if doctors are giving reasonable advice,
patients could not easily prove they would have rejected it. Nor will damages
often be juicy enough to induce contingency fee lawyers to take such cases.112
Patients might refuse to pay for treatments they would have rejected if
properly informed. The claim would resemble that of customers whose
brokers churned their accounts. This is doctrinally neat but practically messy.
Patients would have to realize that they had been denied information about
cheaper care and would have chosen it. A lawyer would ordinarily have to
help formulate the claim and make it stick, since no billing office would listen
to that kind of whining from patients. 113
110
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In sum, doctors and patients sometimes discuss costs, but not as often nor
thoroughly as consumerism would need. Promoting such conversations is
onerous, and the law is ill-suited to the task.

B. WILL DOCTORS EMBRACE THRIFT?
Suppose now that doctors and patients do discuss costs.
Those
conversations will be bootless if doctors aren't committed to economies, since
doctors shape - often make - patients' choices about tests and treatments. AI;
one court said, the doctor
dictates what brand [of drugs] the patient is to buy ... [and]
orders the amount of drugs and prescribes the quantity to be
consumed. In other words, the patient is a captive consumer.
There is no other profession or business where a member thereof
can dictate to a consumer what brand he must buy, what amount
he must buy, and how fast he must consume it and how much he
must pay with the further condition to the consumer that any
failure to fully comply must be at the risk of his own health ....
[T]he patient then becomes a totally captive consumer and the
doctor has a complete monopoly. 114
And when patients enter a hospital, the doctor's influence over patients'
expenditures intensifies. "Patients rarely abandon doctors, reject doctors'
recommendations, or demand second opinions."115 So if doctors don't help
patients economize - if they don't lead their patients to economize - patients
will be sore pressed to economize intelligently.
Much in doctors' culture, training, and situation dulls economizing zeal.
First, we got to consumerism because doctors had little reason to control costs
and much reason to drive them up. The more services doctors sold and the
more they charged for a service, the wealthier they got. In a simpler day,
doctors had fewer services to offer and modest market power, and fee-forservice medicine could be kept within patients' ability to pay, especially since
doctors charged the poor less than the rich. 116 When health insurance became
a basic benefit and when (over the "socialized medicine" laments of organized
medicine) Medicare and Medicaid were instituted, fee-for-service remained
standard. Fees, however, kept growing even while doctors' provision of
services did not always correlate with need117 and doctors used some of their
114
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market power to sustain their incomes. us This dynamic drove us to managed
care and still operates, even ifless universally.
Furthermore, organized medicine and many physicians resented managed
care's challenge to their authority, and they remain resentful.n9 "Under cover
of the managed care backlash, physicians and hospitals began to reassert their
prerogatives. With the erosion of stringent cost controls, physicians gained
greater leverage in clinical decisions. "120 As Hyman bluntly argues, "The
medical profession wants to regain its ability to dictate the terms of trade with
regard to cost and quality."121 In short, organized medicine and many doctors
have fought long, hard, and bitterly to preserve their unconstrained authority
in general and their ability to avoid cost controls particularly. 122
Dr. Bloche takes the point further. He writes that by the early 1960s,
physicians had "won consumers' confidence" and that many physicians "took
opportunistic advantage by acquiring ownership interests in hospitals, clinical
laboratories, and other health care businesses." Doctors' "[a]nticommercial
norms" eroded, so that doctors "now routinely advertise, accept discounted
fees from managed health plans, take ownership interests in facilities
financially affected by clinical utilization patterns, and sign contracts that
reward them financially for withholding care."123
Doctors, then, have interests that disincline them to make costcontainment a priority. These are only interests and only disinclinations.
Many individual physicians lack or ignore those interests, and many restrain
or reject the disinclination. Furthermore, organized medicine is more
disorganized and various than ever, so its ultimate reaction to consumerism is
unpredictable.
Doctors' doubts about cost-containment are reinforced by admirable
aspects of their culture. Doctors are moved by craft pride. Their norms call
them to provide the best care available, to follow the best practices, to apply
the gold standard. 124 One reason many doctors loathe managed care is that
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they feel it prevents them from giving that care. 125 And doctors are trained in
"Hippocratic individualism,"~ 26 a single-minded commitment to the interest of
the patient seeking help. Much of this benefits patients, and in much of this
doctors speak for patients. As individuals (if not as members of an insured
group), patients want all the medical care their doctors think they need.
Furthermore, doctors' paternalism - less pejoratively, their role accustoms them to persuade patients toward health. Patients often need
persuading. They eat, drink, and smoke; they avoid doctors; they don't buy
drugs they've been prescribed; they don't take drugs they've bought; they flee
from burdensome treatment. Inducing patients to cooperate in their own care
is part of the physician's stock-in-trade and part of what patients expect. 127
Little in all this inspires doctors to save money; much in this arms them to
resist lowering standards. This commitment may bend to fit economic
circumstances, but not easily. 128 Nevertheless, doctors are pragmatists. They
want patients to receive the best care, but they are not flatly unwilling to help
patients save money. Not at all. In our interviews and our work with medical
colleagues, we encounter many physicians who are warmly anxious to help
patients who have trouble paying for care. 129 Scholarship confirms this. For
example, three-quarters of the doctors in one national survey routinely
consider insured patient's out-of-pocket costs in some clinical situations,
especially when prescribing drugs. 130 In one academic medical center, 88% of
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the physicians thought patients' costs were important in prescribing, and 71%
would sacrifice some efficacy to save some money. 131
What is more, doctors may see more realistically than patients that a
treatment is futile or ineffective. Nor is economy always inimical to health.
Thus we found in interviews with a convenience sample of seven primary-care
physicians that doctors are most willing to save money when it promotes
optimal care, as when a patient is likelier to take prescribed medication if the
doctor chooses a cheaper even ifless effective drug. 132
In sum, foregoing care to conserve costs conflicts with much that is
elemental in the training and culture of doctors. It also conflicts with much
that is elemental in the feelings of patients. They want to save money, but
they don't want mingy short-term economies at major long-term expense. All
the conflicting traditions and principles and interests and emotions may leave
doctors unsure when to press patients to economize and when to press them
to spend. Pragmatic doctors will, for instance, accede more readily to
patients' thrift where the goal is controlling symptoms the patient can
perceive and where long-term harm is unlikely. After all, patients ordinarily
are motivated by their illness itself to control arthritis pain, or to take
medications that slow the onset of dementia.
But where symptoms aren't obvious and where mistakes may be
irreparable (controlling blood pressure, cholesterol, and blood sugar are
classics) doctors more readily urge treatments on patients. Doctors we
interviewed gave examples that ranged from persuasion to manipulation to
coercion. One doctor told a woman who balked at a mammogram that he was
scheduling one anyway. Another called a taxi to take a patient to the hospital
to prevent her from going home. Yet another doctor enlisted family members
in convincing recalcitrant patients. Still another doctor asked a patient who
wouldn't leave her grandchild to come in for an exam, ''who will take of your
grandchild if you die?"
In sum, doctors dance a delicate dance to
accommodate patients' ambivalent wants and ambiguous needs.
But if consumerism prevailed, might doctors decide that a reputation for
economy would attract patients? Might doctors recognize a social duty to
cabin costs? Perhaps, but managed care's experience is not encouraging.
Even doctors who tolerated managed care did not respond as consumerism
expects. They did not so much adjust recommendations to each patient's
individual situation as change their style of practice across the board. 133
Economists celebrated this "spill-over effect," but consumerism expects
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patients and doctors to make efficient decisions tailored to each patient's
circumstances and preferences. 134
Suppose now that doctors expect to help patients economize. Even such
doctors face many practical problems in the examining room. For example,
when should doctors propose thrifty treatments if thrifty means less effective?
How much should doctors know about patients' financial situations? How
much should doctors ask? The problems doctors will face become clearer
when we realize that many patients need help not just with individual medical
decisions, but with managing their financial situation when medical costs
pressure their budgets. But a national survey found that "while physicians are
generally ready to discuss issues of cost with patients, they are less ready to
discuss medical budgeting . . . ."135 The problem is not just that cost
information is hard even for doctors to ascertain; it is also that budgeting
discussions require doctors to understand something of patients' financial
situation. But doctors cannot master the insurance programs of all their
patients, and doctors are misinformed about those programs even in general
terms. For example, the same national survey found that "many physicians
may not know that less than half of employers make contributions to their
employees' medical savings accounts."136 Furthermore, medical budgeting
raises issues not just of finance, but of the quality of medical care. Yet
patients may find it difficult to articulate their ideas on this subject, and
"primary care physicians do not generally trust the quality-of-care
information that patients in [consumer-directed health plans] may
increasingly utilize. "137
This brings us to a problem with informed consent and all other kinds of
mandated disclosure in medicine - time. Doctors often complain that
managed care robbed them of time with patients. In fact, doctors apparently
spend slightly more time with patients than they used to. 138 But doctors ftel
hurried because so much more is asked of them: Medicine can do more
things, treatments are more complex, chronic diseases requiring elaborate
care proliferate, and medicine's jurisdiction has broadened as problems are
medicalized.
So discussions of cost must jostle for time with other urgent matters. "The
ever-expanding repertoire of interventions, screening tests, vaccines, and
devices has dramatically increased the work of patient care for all physician
For a general practitioner to provide "all recommended
specialties."
preventive services to a panel of 2500 patients could require up to 71/2 hours
a day of physician time. Generalist physicians repprt that roughly 4 separate
problems are addressed at each office visit for patients older than 65 years and
134
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even more issues are addressed for patients with chronic illnesses such as
diabetes. "139 One study concluded that doctors cannot "deliver all of the
services recommended by the USPSTF [U.S. Preventive Services Task Force]
to a representative panel of patients." Nor is reducing the doctor's panel "a
very practical or realistic solution," since "a 50% reduction in panel size is
needed to reduce the time requirement to approximately 4 hours a day."140 To
put the problem differently: "Current practice guidelines for only 10 chronic
illnesses require more time than primary care physicians have available for
patient care overall."141 All this threatens consumerism and its dream of
adding another topic - cost - to already overtaxed discussions.
Consumerist patients must learn enough about the risks, benefits, and
costs of tests and treatments to make economical choices. This already
happens somewhat. But it must happen much more for consumerism to
flourish, and many obstacles make that unlikely: Patients make few medical
decisions on their own. Once they consult a physician, they enter a
relationship which disposes them to follow doctors' orders. Under any kind of
insurance, patients and doctors are reluctant to discuss costs, doctors know
too little about costs, and doctors are not driven to economize. Consumerism
has depreciated these realities, but they menace its prospects.
V. "CUMBERSOME, COMPLEX, AND DETAILED": CAN
INFORMATION BE PRESENTED EFFECTIVELY?

Warum soll es einfach sein, wenn es so leicht kompliziert sein kann?142
German witticism
In assessing the prerequisites of consumerism, we have reached several
conclusions. First, medical markets often offer fewer choices than markets
need. Second, much information is unavailable and hard to assemble. Third,
sources of information are often hard to evaluate. Fourth, doctors may be illsituated and even undisposed to help patients save money. But suppose,
arguendo, that information about plans, providers and treatments could
practically be assembled by trusted and trustworthy sources and that doctors
want to help patients economize. Can that information be put into a form
consumers can use to make good decisions?
A. LITERACY AND NUMERACY

The first problem in presenting health care choices is that many people
read and cipher poorly. Most information about health plans, much
information about providers, and swaths of information about treatments are
in writing. Yet the "1992 National Adult Literacy Survey . . . , the most
139
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accurate portrait of English language literacy in the United States, found that
40 to 44 million Americans, or approximately one quarter of the US
population, are functionally illiterate, and another 50 million have marginal
literacy skills."143 Illiteracy matters in health care: A "third of Englishspeaking patients at 2 public hospitals could not read and understand basic
health-related materials," and 42% of the patients studied could not
"comprehend directions for taking medication on an empty stomach, 26%
could not understand information on an appointment slip, and 60% could not
understand a standard consent form."
Patients' incomprehension of
"information about disease management, prevention, and informed consent
... [means that] physicians are not successful in communicating essential
health care information to their patients, particularly to those with inadequate
health literacy."~
Furthermore, many literate people cannot manage
complicated material. For example, to reach the 80th percentile in literacy
you need only comprehend a (straightforward) definition of "peremptory
challenge" given jury pools.
Consumers are also hobbled by innumeracy: 145 "Numeracy, or the ability
to process basic probability and numerical concepts,"146 influences
"comprehension of important health information."147 Numeracy "is related to
health literacy, but makes an independent contribution to comprehension and
choices" and can even be "a stronger predictor of these outcomes than health
literacy."148
Numeracy is increasingly important because patients "are increasingly
being exposed to quantitative information about risks for disease and benefits
of treatment." Yet "many persons do not work well with numbers."149 For
example, people were asked to: (1) guess how often a flipped coin would come
up heads in 1,000 tries, (2) asked to calculate 1% of 1,000, and (3) turn a
proportion (1 in 1000) into a percentage. "Thirty percent of respondents had
0 correct answers, 28% had 1 correct answer, 26% had 2 correct answers, and
16% had 3 correct answers." This innumeracy hobbled women given
"quantitative risk reduction data" about mammography. Few of them could
"apply quantitative information about the benefit of mammography to their
perceived risk for death from breast cancer."150
Similarly, innumeracy confounds consumers making many kinds of
purchases. For example, picking and using credit cards are simpler than
understanding and buying health care. Yet "[ w ]hen thousands of adults from
across the country were given tests of basic math and basic literacy, a
44
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significant portion of the population was unable to make the comparisons
necessary to assess the cost of credit card debt."151
It is thus inevitable that one study "found that comprehending key
differences between a CDHP and a conventional PPO was challenging for
consumers, particularly those with lower numeracy." They understood "less
about the CDHP and reported having more difficulty understanding plan
differences than those higher in numeracy; yet they were substantially more
likely to select the CDHP." The study's authors suggest that "once enrolled,
less numerate enrollees also may have more difficulty making the type of costeffective decisions that CDHPs were developed to foster." 152
In sum, anyone presenting information to consumers climbs a high
barrier - many people read badly and cipher worse. Yet much health care
information must be presented in writing and numbers, and much of it is
inherently complex, dense, and obscure.
B. PRESENTATION

Now assume away literacy and numeracy problems. How well can
information be presented? We begin by asking what consumers need to know
about health plans. Consumers say they want to know about:
(1) access (to chosen doctor, to specialists, length of time to get an
appointment, ability to get care when needed, telephone access);
(2) amount of paperwork; (3) benefits; (4) choice ofprovider (of
doctors, of hospitals, ability to keep one's own doctor);
(5) communication/interpersonal skills/caring of provider;
(6) convenience (of choosing doctor, getting care, location);
(7) coordination of care; (8) costs; (9) courtesy and manner of
physicians and staff; (10) hospital ratings; (11) good value for the
money; (12) plan administrative hassles; and (13) quality (of care
overall, of particular types of care, of providers).153
Well, sure. Each item is reasonable, but the list is wickedly long and could
easily be expanded. And most of the items comprise multiple elements. For
example, "access" includes the "ability to get care when needed." This in turn
subsumes things like how the plan decides when a treatment is covered (an
issue that provoked bitterness about and lawsuits over managed care). That
issue, again in turn, is a fountain of questions about who decides what
treatment is excluded on what grounds and how patients challenge
exclusions. 154
All these things could - perhaps should - influence consumers' choices.
But consumers cannot mean what they say. They often ignore even simple
disclosures. For example, Blue Cross of California posted plan enrollees'
ratings of hospitals' costs. It used the Zagat method, "where '$' is assigned to
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the lowest-cost hospitals and'$$$$' to the highest." Great idea. But "the plan
discontinued this feature" for lack ofuse. 155
Wanting much but using little is normal.
For example, patients
fabulously over-estimate how much information they want in choosing
treatments. In one large study, "[m]ost subjects (76.2%) responded that they
would want to hear of any adverse effects [of a treatment], no matter how
rare." And 83% wanted to know about any "serious adverse effect, no matter
how rare."156 Do people really want WebMD's whole list of one drug's side
effects: excess stomach acid secretion, irritation of the stomach or intestines,
nausea, vomiting, heartburn, stomach cramps, bronchospasm, stomach ulcers,
intestinal ulcers, hepatitis, stomach or intestinal bleeding, inflammation of
skin, redness of skin, itching, hives, rash, wheezing, trouble breathing, lifethreatening allergic reaction, giant hives, rupture in the wall of the stomach or
intestines, hemolytic anemia, large skin blotches, decreased blood platelets,
decreased white blood cells, and decreased appetite? Will people still want
the list when they learn that this alarming drug is Aspirin?
But suppose we winnow out the information that most helps consumers.
How do we present it? Many have tried. Many have failed. For instance,
California posted a sample charge master. But, Reinhardt concludes,
"prospective patients would be hard put to make sense of these price lists."157
For another instance, "the Minnesota Health Data Institute distributed a 16page, statewide report card that featured comparison tables and color-coded
graphs of consumer satisfaction within categories of health plans and
compared 38 plans based on 20 performance measures." However, "less than
half of those seeing the report thought it was helpful for deciding on a plan.
Consumers found the report cards cumbersome, complex, and detailed."158
So why are report cards "cumbersome, complex, and detailed"? Why not
just make them handy, straightforward, and simple? We again consult
experience in related areas. Institutional review boards must approve all
"human-subject" research, and they notoriously make informed consent their
summum, perhaps solum, bonum.
Commissions and commentators,
researchers and institutional review boards, have long demanded handy,
straightforward, and simple consent forms. Nevertheless, IRBs persistently
insist on adding information to forms, and they can be tens of (repellent)
pages long.
Why don't IRBs practice what they preach? Partly because in a given case
no one can deny that one more datum might be crucial to someone's decision.
As we saw, if you ask patients how much they want to know, they say
"everything." If patients think they "want to hear of any serious adverse effect,
no matter how rare,"159 the slippery slope to interminable disclosure is slick. 160
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And bad as the information problem has been when IRBs review research, the
problem is worse when consumers choose plans and providers because much
more information can be relevant. Research subjects are told the risks of one
experiment; health care consumers may need any kind of treatment for any
kind of ailment.
So with health care information, less is not more. But perversely, more is
too much. First, who reads long forms? 161 Second, the longer the form, the
harder it is to understand. A "large body of empirical work suggest[s] that the
integration of different types of information and values into a decision is a
very difficult cognitive process." For example, "people can process and use
only a limited number of variables." In one nifty study, Slavic asked expert
handicappers to predict horse races using "from 5, 10, 20, and, later 40
variables." The more information the experts had, the more confident they
were. "However, predictive ability was as good with 5 variables as with 10, 20,
or 40." Worse, "reliability of the choices decreased as more information was
made available. That is, when individuals had more information, their ability
to use it 'consistently' declined.m 62
Not only does adding information not reliably improve and may impair
understanding, it can reduce the amount of information people use. "An
increase in the number of alternatives (three, six, and nine) being considered
in this research has been shown also to increase the number of participants
(21 percent, 31 percent, and 77 percent, respectively) who rely on elimination
strategies ... leading to a reduction in the amount of information used.m 63
The hopeless choice between less and more information pervades health
care decisions. Plans are irreducibly complex - they either cover or exclude
every human ailment. They allocate unpredictable costs among many players
in elaborate ways.
They are confusingly structured and mysteriously
administered. 164
Even a single aspect of a single plan can be too complex to be explained to
people of ordinary patience. For example, a notoriously upsetting feature of
managed care is capitation - paying providers a fixed sum per year per
patient. This creates an incentive to under-treat patients. Explaining why
this may be sensible is an uphill battle, but that's just the beginning, because
"capitation" is exhaustingly complicated. Its effects are "mediated by such
variables as size of the patient panel, amount of the capitation sum,
refinement of risk adjustments, dollar value of stop-loss provisions, and scope
of risk (does it extend, for example, to specialist referrals and drugs?), not to
mention such relative intangibles as the force of professional ethics and fear of
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malpractice suits." So there "is no obvious informational middle ground
between demonizing capitation and turning consumers into incipient health
service researchers. "165
One of us (Hall) tried to solve this problem with "extensive efforts at
disclosure." Even then, disclosing incentives had "limited or no impact on
patient trust of physicians and health plans." No wonder plan representatives
said that disclosures ''have been a 'big yawn,' 'useless,' and have not caused
'even a ripple' of a reaction. One large plan which, like others, invites
members to call if they have questions or want additional information,
received only two inquiries in the first two years."166
Complexity has another aspect. Consumers need baselines. You can rate
the Ritz because you've stayed at the Marriott and the Hotel Misere. But
people know little and misunderstand much about health care and health care
financing. Professor Sage is mild - "the American public is poorly informed
about modern health care financing and delivery. "167 People misperceive even
their own coverage. "Previous research has indicated that consumers do not
understand many of the key concepts of managed care; our study results
indicate that this lack of understanding also applies to their own health
plan."168 Although plan members' "accuracy of reporting on some individual
attributes was fairly high, fewer than one-third of respondents (30.3 percent)
correctly reported all four attributes .... [J]ust over half of respondents (56
percent) accurately reported both network attributes, while just under half
( 48.8 percent) accurately reported both gatekeeper attributes."169
This is not reprehensible; people have better things to do than become
health care experts. Nevertheless, consumers lack ''baseline information that
could provide context for required disclosure,'' and they therefore "can easily
misinterpret even accurate data. In one example, potential enrollees regarded
report card data showing high hospitalization rates of health plan enrollees
for pneumonia as showing leniency in approving inpatient treatment rather
than demonstrating failure to administer vaccinations."170
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In sum, consumers must learn forbiddingly much and make forbiddingly
hard comparisons. This is why comprehensible report cards are so necessary,
and so hard to write. We again consult similar problems in related areas. The
"readability" of many kinds of mandated disclosures has been much studied,
and the news is bad: It is almost impossible to put complicated information in
written language that most people can understand. For example, two-thirds
of the privacy disclosure forms academic medical centers used "were written
beyond the 12th grade reading level, and almost the entire sample (90%) fell
in the difficult range of reading ease."l71 A similar study of hospitals found the
forms ''beyond the reading capacity of the majority of American adults."172
Even the model forms IRBs distribute are often well below IRBs' own
"readability standards."173
So, you say, if report cards are unreadable, make them readable. If
language is complex, simplifY it. If text is dense, prune it. If pages are dull,
brighten them. But people have been trying to do exactly this for decades.
Attempts to improve the information consumers receive about health
insurance, like attempts to improve informed consent, have had some success,
but not enough success to equip patients and consumers to make good
decisions. For example, there were only "modest gains in Medicare-related
knowledge" in both "a local and a national study."174 In short, nothing in the
experience of mandated disclosure in other areas suggests that information
about health plans can be presented to consumers in a way that will bring
them up to consumerist standards. And nothing in the experience of telling
consumers about health plans or patients about treatments suggests
otherwise.175
We have asked whether consumers will learn enough about their choices
to select plans, providers, and treatments shrewdly enough to buy the best
coverage, choose the best doctors and hospitals, select the thriftiest
treatments, and thus help control health care costs. We have charted a long
list of reasons consumers cannot find or understand the information they
need. No doubt some progress can be made in some places in some ways. But
strenuous efforts both in health care and in analogous areas have barely
budged the meter, and we should not expect much better in any foreseeable
future.
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C. DEUS EX MACHINA: EDUCATION
Consumerists defend consumerism by invoking the same "Great Solution"
that will rescue us from so many other problems - education. If only patients
can be taught more facts and more skills. As Kapp says, the champions of
informed consent place "much faith ... in ... patients to comprehend and
manage adequately the basic information needed to satisfY informed consent
aspirations." These tools include "more sophisticated decision aids in the
form of information technology; the provision of written handouts to patients;
presentation of information in qualitative, quantitative, and graphic formats,
simplified to reach the lower literate patient; and the showing of
videotapes. "176
This is the triumph of hope over experience. Educating consumers to
thrifty and intelligent choices has been part of the health care ethos for years.
Yet the results are dispiriting. For example, a decade ago Medicare
beneficiaries chose between a fee-for-service plan and managed care plans.
When asked about their choice, "few" beneficiaries were well informed. Even
those who used "multiple information sources ... often ... [had] less-thanadequate knowledge."177 Thirty percent knew almost nothing about HMOs.
Thirty-one percent of HMO respondents and 30 percent of traditional
Medicare respondents "failed to pass the screening questions and could not go
on to take the knowledge test. "178 Of those who passed the screening test,
"only 16 percent had adequate knowledge ... to choose between traditional
Medicare and an HMO. More than 41 percent scored in the 'inadequate'
range ... [, and] 7 percent scored in the lowest quartile (equal to or worse
than guessing). "179 In short, these consumers knew far too little to make good
choices. As Cunningham puts it, "A considerable body of evidence indicates
that early efforts to educate consumers have not been very effective .... m80
What, though, of the tools Kapp lists? With skill and struggle, they can
produce statistically significant improvements in understanding. But they
have not brought and will not bring patients to adequate understanding. Take
one vital consideration for consumers. Lubalin writes, "With appropriate
education, over time consumers may begin to understand the role that plan
structure plays relative to doctor performance in affecting their care and plan
experiences."181 But researchers have long striven to create that "appropriate
education" - with dismal results. And see how cautious Lubalin is. This
education will take time. All this education over time "may" teach consumers
something, but that "something" is only "beginning" to understand the
subject.
Consumers remain poorly informed, even about their own plans, even
after extraordinary efforts to educate them. One study, for example, "surveyed
adults a year after they were enrolled in a New York State pilot project aimed
176
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at expanding health care coverage for the uninsured." The five plans "made
extensive efforts to educate enrollees about the plans,"182 including "individual
in-person enrollment meetings, during which staff describe eligibility and
benefits; brochures or videotapes; detailed enrollment contracts; questionand-answer documents in Spanish and English; and, at one plan, a required
educational seminar."183 Nevertheless, "fewer than a third of enrollees could
answer all three questions correctly; for four of the five plans, fewer than onefifth could answer all three questions correctly." Discouragingly, for example,
"as few as 29.2 percent of respondents in Brooklyn understood that their plan
covered out-of-area emergency care despite explicit wording in the Health
Insurance Plan of Greater New York (HIP) handbook," and except "in
Manhattan, fewer than 42 percent of respondents knew that their plan limited
their choice of hospitals."184
Nor do the lessons of related areas make education a convincing Great
Solution. Informed consent may be the closest comparison, and decades of
striving show that while skillfully created and energetically administered
education can nudge up understanding, it regularly fails to prepare patients to
make truly informed choices about complex issues. Nor has education worked
wonderfully better in other areas in which consumers labor. For example,
"investment education does not significantly change investment behavior
among 40I(k) plan participants."185
Another crucial point is regularly overlooked. Education is the Great
Solution not just to this problem, but to many problems. People are daily
admonished to become better consumers and be more responsible for more
decisions in more areas. An ever-more complex world generates ever-more
things to learn. Choices about even standard products proliferate. 186 Who, for
example, can really buy a telephone? Corded? Wireless? Cellular? Internet?
Which phone company, or cell phone company, or Internet company? Which
manufacturer? Which bells? Which whistles? A camera? Internet? What's
cheapest? Most useful? Best? And what other questions are we too elderly to
know about?
Consumers must do more than buy goods and services intelligently. For
example, defined-contribution pensions oblige us to manage retirement
accounts (and "privatizing" Social Security would exacerbate things nicely).
Other financial issues proliferate, like handling debt. 187 And think of all the
(often changing) lessons about health and safety everyone should learn. No
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wonder it has taken so many decades of so much effort to bring home the
information that has gradually convinced many people not to smoke.
We are no enemies of education. Gladly would we learn, and gladly teach.
But fifty professorial years have taught us that both teaching and learning are
humblingly difficult. This is a lesson consumerists seem not to have learned.
VI. ANAL¥ZING INFORMATION

The human understanding is not a dry light, but is infused by desire
and emotion, which give rise to 'wishful science'. For man prifers to
believe what he wants to be true. He therifore rejects difficulties, being
impatient of inquiry; sober things, because they restrict his hope;
deeper parts of Nature, because of his superstition; the light of
experience, because of his arrogance and pride, lest his mind should
seem to concern itself with things mean and transitory; things that are
strange and contrary to all expectation, because ofcommon opinion.
Francis Bacon
Novum Organum
Again suppose away all the problems we've traversed. Imagine we have
adequate choices. We have reliable information. We have selected the right
information to present. We have decided how to present it. Doctors have
cooperated. We have presented it. Consumers have received it. Consumers
have understood it. We have at last reached the goal- consumers situated to
choose health plans, providers, and treatments intelligently. How willingly
and well will consumers do so?
On the whole, people reason less willingly and well than sound
consumerist decisions require. This may conflict with ordinary intuitions. It
certainly conflicts with consumerism's assumptions. But those intuitions and
assumptions rest on misconceptions about human nature. In this section we
criticize those misconceptions. Then we present evidence that people make
unfamiliar decisions generally, and medical decisions particularly, less
adroitly than consumerism requires.
A. HOMO ARBITER
Consumerism misconceives human nature.
Understandably.
Its
misconceptions fit conventional intuitions about how people make decisions.
Its misconceptions are shared by the field that treats the ethical problems of
health care - bioethics. And its misconceptions underlie the law of mandated
disclosure. Consumerism, bioethics, and much law rest on a plausible
assumption and plausible inferences from the assumption about human
nature. Both the assumption and the reasoning from it are partly correct.
Nevertheless, they both fail in ways that mislead policy-makers and rulewriters.
The plausible assumption is that people demand "control." The plausible
inferences are that therefore people: (1) want to make all the decisions that
could affect their lives, and (2) make those decisions skillfully. In other
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words, consumerism, bioethics, and much law expect a world populated by
homo arbiter, by people whose raison d'etre is making decisions. Homo
arbiter cherishes decisions, reaches out to make decisions, relishes decisions.
There is obviously crucial truth in the assumption, the inferences, and even
this view of human nature. But the truth is only partial and leaves out much
in human nature that is necessary for establishing workable policies.
First, the assumption. "Control" matters. But most people don't want
control of everything, at least if that means mastering difficult subjects to
reach difficult conclusions. Control may be comforting, and impotence is
misery. But people routinely acquiesce in decisions with relatively little
information about them.
Next, the inferences. The first inference is that wanting control means
wanting to tackle every decision in sight. But, ironically, seeking plenary
control is inimical to enjoying the things that really matter to you. Complete
control means making choices, and making choices well enough to achieve
"control" is soul-sucking and time-absorbing. You can't exercise- plenary
control and still devote yourself to, as Freud put it, "work and love."
Furthermore, who likes decisions? The drudgery of learning, the agonies of
indecision, the risks of responsibility - these are charms cheerfully foregone. 188
The second inference is that people make decisions capably. Making good
decisions is harshly harder than it looks. The process is less rational and less
under our control than we think. Our decisions are driven by intuitions that
are almost invisible to us. And "an enormous body of psychological evidence
tells us that a person (such as you or I) has no reliable insight into the roots of
his own intuition."189 In fact, what seems like making a decision is often
finding a rationale for a choice we have made unknowingly.
When we say people are less avid to make decisions and make them less
well than consumerism hopes, we are easily misunderstood. Our meaning will
become apparent as we show how consumers actually analyze purchases of
health plans, providers, and treatments. However, two clarifications may
avert misunderstandings. First, while people are reluctant to take on all kinds
of dicey decisions, they certainly care what happens to themselves. Some
choices almost everyone wants to make personally (marriage, for example),
and some choices we make by individual preference. But people resist making
many critical decisions, and often for excellent reasons.
Second, we are not saying that people rarely make good decisions. People
manage their lives just fine because most decisions concern familiar subjects.
When you make the same decision repeatedly you learn what your options are,
see choices work out or fail, and practice making decisions more shrewdly.
You build up reliable intuitions. Experience is a great teacher. But you lose
all these advantages when you make unfamiliar decisions. And choosing
health plans, providers, and medical treatments swamps you in the
unfamiliar.
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B. LET THIS CUP ...
If people refuse to ponder a choice, nobody can make them. And if people
are reluctant to make a fully pondered choice, they won't collect and analyze
information adequately. But unstudied and unanalyzed choices can be
disastrous. Medical information is often elusive, obscure, unfamiliar, messy,
and uncertain. If consumers do not energetically master this confusion, they
cannot make well-founded purchases. They will not ferret out information,
read it, grapple with it, survey alternatives, probe preferences, or bring
themselves to a conclusion. Consumerism demands willing consumers.
Consumerism will only find them sporadically. In area after area of life,
people say and show that they are less thirsty to choose than consumerists
expect. Some of the richest evidence of this reluctance is in studies of a
decision patients must make- the choice about medical treatments. We study
this example in detail because if people don't seize treatment decisions, they
are unlikely to seize other medical decisions.
The evidence that patients do not long to make medical decisions is
compelling. One study can stand for many. 190 Ende and his colleagues
concluded that "patients' preferences for decision making in general were
weak." Where 0 meant no desire to make decisions and 100 meant an intense
desire to do so, the mean score was 33. Worse, "as patients were asked to
consider increasingly severe illnesses, their desires to make decisions
themselves declined. "191
The example of medical decisions suggests why people yearn less for
"control" than consumerists imagine. Patients have excellent reasons for
accepting guidance, especially from experts. Illness corrodes the crafts and
arts needed to learn novel and knotty things. Patients are exhausted, rattled,
discouraged, harried, and hurried. They are absorbed by the problems of
getting through the day that illness exacerbates and by the large questions
about life that illness thrusts before them. Rarely can they spare time and
attention to collect information thoroughly, assimilate it properly, and analyze
it soundly. Rather, they turn with relief to people with expertise and
experience for guidance.
People who avoid medical decisions should a fortiori resist choosing
health plans. That choice turns on scaling mountains of daunting data. It
requires anticipating unpredictable needs too dreadful to imagine. Medical
decisions generally can be made with less information and more help than
decisions about health plans. So who wants to choose a plan? We ourselves
do not, and we have met only one person who might (maybe). And as all
teachers know, unwilling learners are poor learners.
There is yet more evidence that people approach health care purchases
diffidently. Decades ago, before widespread health insurance, patients had
every reason to buy care carefully. Nevertheless,
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few patients either knew or tried to discover whether their health
care could be purchased at different prices; prices were never
published or advertised. Patients generally had faith in their
physicians and assumed the fees were fair and valid - whether or
not they could afford to pay them. They obediently entered
whatever hospital they were sent to and took their prescriptions
to the pharmacy or provider that the physician suggested.
Experience indicates that few patients, even those who
complained about the costs, did any shopping around for better
prices. 192
If consumers thought consumerism wonderfully advantageous, they might
overcome their aversion to intimidating decisions. But "individuals with
comprehensive health insurance were significantly more satisfied with their
health plan than individuals" with consumer plans. They were "more likely
than those with a [consumer plan] to report that they were extremely or very
likely to recommend their health plan to a friend or coworker." And people in
consumer plans were "less likely than those with more comprehensive health
insurance to report that they were likely to stay with their current plan if they
had the opportunity to change plans."193
Furthermore, consumerist decisions almost invite evasion because they
are both distressing and avoidable. Consumerism forces patients to (1) choose
and (2) economize. But choosing is labor, and economizing is sacrifice. In
addition, consumerism must convince people that health care costs them
money. Making the flight of money out the door visible is not exhibiting
something pleasant. Not only is assessing health care choices distasteful; it is
delightfully easy to neglect. If you are working with a doctor, follow the
doctor's advice. If you are choosing a health plan, select one or two plan
attributes and rest your decision on them. Or just follow your colleagues' lead.
Check a box. File and forget.
We said earlier that if people don't want to make decisions, they won't
make them well. There is direct evidence that in making medical choices
people do not do the things they themselves say they need to do. People
acknowledge that information is crucial: even the same studies that say
patients are reluctant to make medical decisions say that patients want
information. For example, in the Ende study, "the mean score for information
seeking was [on the 0-to-100 scale] 79.5 fflll.5." 194
But while consumers insist that they want loads of information, they
shrug most of it off. For example, only about half of the people in consumerist
plans "indicated that they had made use of the information about quality and
cost of their doctors" and "had tried to use information on the quality of
hospitals."195 For another example, a national study of Medicare beneficiaries
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who had undergone high-risk surgery (abdominal-aneurysm repair, heartvalve replacement, or resection of the bladder, lung or stomach for cancer)
reported that only "10% of respondents seriously considered going elsewhere
for surgery. Few respondents (11%) looked for information to compare
hospitals. Almost all respondents thought their hospital and surgeon had
good reputations (94% and 88%, respectively) ...."196
The theory of consumerism is that people will shop for the best
combination of cost and quality. But the evidence suggests that quality tends
to get ignored in decisions. "Literature suggests that patients do not engage in
rational or 'consumerist' behavior when searching for or choosing physicians.
They instead rely heavily on recommendations from family and friends and
engage in limited searches for alternative physicians .... "197 The Harris study
"confirm[ed] the image depicted in the previous literature of patients as
passive consumers of physician services" and concluded "that, in the current
market, physicians do not have to compete to maintain the loyalty of
established patients."198 Similarly, a recent study found that "[f]ew of the
consumers who needed new providers reported using either price or quality
information in choosing those providers .... "~ 99
One reason that people underuse quality information is (as we said
earlier) that people do not realize how wide the range of quality can be.
Another is that people are not competent to evaluate quality and thus base
choices on things they can evaluate. Thus when focus groups were asked what
they looked for in a doctor, the "majority of responses focused on the
interpersonal aspects of care - communication, respect, and caring." Those
aspects of care are surely crucial. But people do not seem to have made a
considered decision that those aspects are the only crucial ones: when "a
cogent framework was used to present quality information," the group
members "changed their minds about what was important in selecting health
plans and providers and indicated a desire to use indicators of evidence-based
care when making health care choices."200
We have presented evidence that people make medical choices less
willingly than consumerism assumes and needs. That evidence is confirmed
by evidence that people avoid other consequential decisions. For example, in
financial planning, "passive decision-making" is the norm.
"[M]any
households appear to passively accept the status quo." 201 Thus, companies
that used different default choices for employee contributions to retirement
plans found employees simply sticking with whatever position they had been
assigned.
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Retirement planning provides a close and fruitful comparison to buying
health- care plans. The former is relatively easy, since most people are too
poor to have elaborate investment choices and need only a few simple
principles - like "diversify!" - that are ceaselessly repeated everywhere.
Nevertheless, many people have not even tried to plan for their retirement.
"Only 42 percent of workers report they and/or their spouse have tried to
calculate how much money they will need to have saved by the time they retire
so· that they can live comfortably in retirement." 202 Gloriously unrealistic
expectations about retirement abound. For example, "[t]wo-thirds of workers
say they expect to work for pay after they retire (66 percent).... However, just
one-quarter of retirees report having actually worked for pay at some time
during their retirement .... "203
Furthermore, many people misunderstand the most basic facts and
principles of retirement investing. A "1995 survey by John Hancock Financial
Services found that a majority of respondents thought money market funds
were riskier than government bonds, and felt that their own company stock
was safer than a diversified portfolio."204 People often invest in notoriously
perilous ways. For example, people who can buy company stock for
retirement accounts allocate "nearly 42 percent of the assets [to it], more than
any other type of investment,"205 thus dangerously flouting the "diversify!"
principle (think Enron). Nevertheless, "investors often do not recognize how
difficult these choices are and instead rely on a belief that their innate abilities
will lead to a good investment result."206 (Human self-confidence is
marvelous to behold.)
In sum, consumerism needs willing consumers, but many people are
generally unengaged consumers who resist making decisions in the fullthroated way consumerism assumes. And many people are unengaged healthplan consumers. Brown writes wryly: "The public is not running to
government demanding longer lists of plans and therewith more chances to
ask more probing questions, sift more information, and wage a more valiant
inner struggle against their suspicions of purchasers, plans, and providers." 207
This should not seem strange when we think more attentively about how
people actually live their lives. What people most fundamentally want is not
so much "control" as doing the things that are important to them - working at
rewarding jobs with congenial colleagues, spending time with the people they
love and like, enjoying their leisure, and so on. People have better things to do
than make risky decisions about alarming subjects which require burdensome
202
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work with scant visible reward. Furthermore, if people really tried to make
independent decisions about everything in their lives, they'd do little else.
Who wants to live in a world in which everybody must choose everything
about everything? So, we are increasingly freed from paternalism, for we have
proliferating choices about proliferating things, but we are increasingly
prisoners of the need to learn enough to handle decisions that we make badly,
that we would like to escape, and that divert us from things we would rather
devote ourselves to. Getting and spending we truly lay waste our powers.
This doesn't mean, of course, that people want or expect to avoid choices
altogether. But people confide themselves to experts (like doctors, of course).
They hope (and they expect) that they will be protected against disaster, that
they will not be offered dangerous options. They expect doctors to lead them
to medical prudence. They expect employers to offer them safe pensions.
They expect credit card terms to be fair. They expect cars to be safe. They
expect to be offered safe mortgages.
So too with health plans, providers, and treatments. As Brown rightly
says, people want "assurance that the plans they choose will not treat them
badly and that some accountable body puts consumers' protection high on its
agenda." 208 When people's expectations are disappointed, they want action.
Brown describes a common pattern. "'[C]hoice'- process, symbol, theoretical
linchpin of market visions - is now ubiquitous" in health policy. But it
is also richly ambiguous. Talk about "protecting and promoting
consumer choice" often means two different things, namely,
ensuring that consumers have the power to make appropriately
abundant choices and ensuring that the products (health plans
and providers) from among which consumers choose are safe and
reliable. The first meaning expands the range of choices, depends
on consumers to shop and buy prudently, and invigorates the
market.
The second eliminates harmful choices, invokes
regulation to protect consumers, and expects government to
police and discipline the market. 209
So "health policy debates tend to start out with hearty affirmations of the
first version of choice, only to discover that many problems beset its
realization. Reformers then look to the second set of connotations to discern
the protections consumers need in order to reap the benefits of expanded
choice .... "210 But this reduces the range of choice and drives up costs.
So people want what they can't have. They want choice when they want it,
but they want protection against over-reaching vendors and improvident
decisions. They want cheap mortgages, but they want to be rescued when the
terms that made the mortgages cheap backfire. They want "that consoling
plenitude of option in which modern satisfaction really consists."211 But they
expect that all their options will be good ones. This is not wicked; it is human.
But it bodes ill for the consumerist vision of the vigilant, vigorous, and
victorious consumer.
Id.
Id at 145.
210
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C. THRIFT, THRIFT, HORATIO
We have argued that consumerism specifically and the law of mandated
disclosure generally rest on the homo arbiter misconception of human nature.
Homo arbiter makes decisions willingly and well. But people are less ardent
and attentive consumers than that. How well then, do people reason their
way through the decisions consumerism presents?
In their normal lives, in their normal spheres, normal people normally
make normal decisions adeptly. But weighing health plans, providers, and
treatments is not a normal activity (except to some extent for the chronically
ill). A lovely literature now catalogs the ways people working outside their
normal spheres disserve their goals. That people choose crudely and clumsily
does not, of course, mean that they should not be allowed to choose. But it
has consequences for consumerism's prospects and for pressuring people into
making consumerist decisions.
What, then, would it take for people to pick plans, providers, and
treatments as shrewdly as consumerism demands? The standard formula for
medical decisions is that people should "critically assess their own values and
preferences; determine whether they are desirable; affirm, upon reflection,
these values as ones that should justify their actions; and then be free to
initiate action to realize the values." 212 This placidly hides a maelstrom of
problems.
A scholar of medical decisions wrote years ago that "the stresses of making
major decisions and the various ways people deal with those stresses . . .
frequently result in defective forms of problem solving that fail to meet the
standards of rational decision making. "213 Since then, psychologists have
ingeniously shown how strangely we all perceive and parse the world. A new
subfield - behavioral economics -incorporates into traditional economics this
revised view. People are not the utility maximizers of traditional economics.
Because they have limited resources for making decisions, people do not even
try to make optimal ones. They "satisfice." They take shortcuts in getting and
using information; they settle for the adequate instead of the best. Satisficing
and shortcuts usually, well, satisfice. However, "[s]ome of these shortcuts
systematically color and bias the decisions that individuals reach .... "214 And
the more exotic, arcane, and momentous a decision, the worse satisficing is.
Consumerist decisions often are exotic, arcane, and momentous. Satisficing
may not suffice. 215
212
Arthur L. Caplan, Informed Consent and Provider/Patient Relationships in
Rehabilitation Medicine, in If I Were a Rich Man Could I Buy a Pancreas? and Other Essays
on the Ethics ofHealth Care 245 (Indiana U Press, 1992).
213
Irving L. Janis, The Patient as Decision Maker, in W. Doyle Gentry, ed, Handbook of
Behavioral Medicine 326, 333 (Guilford, 1984).
214
Id at 1531.
215
The vast literature on the sadly abundant defects in human reasoning is still well
described in two classics: Richard Nisbett & Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and
Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Prentice-Hall, 1980); Daniel Kahneman et al, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge U Press, 1982). A more recent
summary of evidence that was written for lawyers is Paul Slovic, Rational Actors and Rational
Fools: The Influence ofAffect on Judgment and Decision-Making, 6 Roger Williams U L Rev
163 (2000). Daniel Gilbert, Stumbling on Happiness (Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), surveys the
issues with welcome wit.
Barak Richman, Behavioral Economics and Health Policy:
Understanding Medicaid's Failure, 90 Cornell L Rev 705 (2005), applies the literature to

THE PATIENT LIFE

53

A sampling suggests the gravity of these problems. The standard formula
for making medical decisions assumes consumers have preferences. Not just
preferences - "a set of preferences which are clearly-defined, well-understood,
and rank-ordered so that people can make logical tradeoffs among them." 216
But, as Slovic warns, preferences are not "simply read off some master list."
We have no set of pre-formed preferences for all occasions. More than we
know or like, we create preferences as we go along, preferences shaped by the
very process of decision. As Slovic explains, "Preferences appear to be
remarkably labile" and "are often constructed - not merely revealed - in the
elicitation process." 217
So as Hibbard puts it, "individuals may not have existing preferences or
beliefs about self-interest, but, rather, construct them in the process of
deciding." This is particularly true of "choices among options that are
important, complex, and unfamiliar, like those consumers face in the current
health care environment."218 Thus while consumers do have preferences about
familiar purchases, "it appears that ... medical care consumers have no wellformed preferences."219 No wonder: Few of us have worked out any beliefs so
systematically, much less beliefs about things both distant and dreadful.
Evidence of people's inchoate and unsettled preferences is that people's
choices about even momentous medical topics are unstable. For example, in a
group of chronically ill elderly patients, "preferences for potentially lifesustaining treatment, assessed in terms of participants' willingness to endure
high-burden treatment for a given chance to avoid death or risk disability to
avoid death, were frequently inconsistent. Many participants became more
and then less willing (or vice versa) over time to undergo future high-burden
therapy or to risk severe disability." 220 A famous study investigated a naturalchildbirth class. It had well worked-out beliefs about anesthesia and pain, but
at "the beginning of active labor ... there was a shift in the preference toward
avoiding labor pains." But "the mothers' preferences shifted again at
postpartum toward avoiding the use of anesthesia during the delivery of her
next child." 221
Instability affects choices of health plans too. Buying insurance requires
imagining how you will feel about possible futures. Not only do "focus group
studies with health care consumers suggest that preferences are not stable,"
health care policy. Block-Lieb and Janger, 84 Texas L Rev 1481 (cited in note 75), applies this
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but "preference shifts have been observed even within the time frame of a
focus group .... "222
Satisficing is risky for other reasons. People succumb to a cavalcade of
well-studied failures in perception, anticipation, and reasoning. Several
examples: First, the "availability heuristic" leads people to over-estimate the
likelihood of memorable and under-estimate the likelihood of mundane
occurrences.
Second, people's reasoning is skewed by the "anchoring
For example,
heuristic," by having a starting point, however arbitrary.
estimates of an item's cost are changed by giving people an arbitrary number like the last two digits of their Social Security number. Third, people are
notoriously influenced by the way choices are "framed." For instance,
treatment looks better if described in terms of its chance of success rather
than its chance of failure (even though both statistics describe the same
likelihood). Fourth, once people have made up their minds, they ingeniously
interpret new evidence - however damning - as confirming their choice.
Fifth, despite all these infirmities, people are invincibly confident that they
make good decisions. "Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken out of
men's minds vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as
one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds of a number of men poor
shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to
themselves?"223
Decisions are distorted more oddly. Decisions turn on how people expect
to respond in possible futures, but people chronically mispredict those
responses. This is the problem of hedonic forecasting, about which a
bemusing literature is blooming. People mispredict even mundane feelings,
mispredict what they will want and how they will like what they get. They
mispredict which snacks they will prefer over the next three weeks, how happy
election results will make them, how much happier living in California instead
of Michigan will make them, how much criticism will wound them, and how
painful visiting dentists and other tormenters will be. 224 Predicting reactions
to insurance coverage, providers, illness, and treatment is surely harder. 225
We all suffer these defects in reasoning, although experience making a
decision moderates them.
This suggests another concern.
It takes
intelligence, sometimes much intelligence, to make sense of what you are
learning, organize it in your mind, anticipate your future, and dissect your
choices. "[I]ntelligence is manifested in generic thinking skills such as
efficient learning, reasoning, problem solving, and abstract thinking. High
intelligence is a useful tool in any life domain, but especially when tasks are
novel, untutored, or complex and situations are ambiguous, changing, or
unpredictable." 226 Medical decisions fit that description, and "being a patient
requires the same cognitive skills that . . . most jobs require for good
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performance: efficient learning, reasoning, and problem solving."227 Many
people lack the intellectual skills needed to choose unfamiliar things well,
since even people rich in intellectual advantage flinch and fail in making
health care choices.
People, in sum, do not select plans, providers, and treatments in the
methodical, meticulous way consumerism intends. They do not use the full
range of relevant information, or evaluate information meticulously, or
scrutinize their preferences. One way we know this is that people often
choose so rapidly that they cannot be surveying, assessing, and weighing
options. In one typical study, almost two-thirds of kidney donors made "an
immediate choice." They "volunteer[ed] immediately upon hearing of the
need without any time delay or any period of deliberation, and they
themselves regard their choice as no decision at all." Only "25% of the donors
... seem to have approximated a classical decision-making pattern," since
they "had done some deliberating and weighing of costs and gains."228
How can people treat serious things so brusquely? They almost must:
"Making trade-off's to integrate conflicting dimensions into an overall choice
is such a complex cognitive task that people tend to use heuristic shortcuts
that may not produce optimal decisions. These simplified strategies include
selecting only one dimension and ignoring others or focusing on concrete,
easy to understand concepts such as cost rather than more complicated and
less precise factors such as quality indicators .... "229 The more overwhelming
a decision seems, the likelier radical shortcuts are taken. 230
For example, patients often base even classically controversial decisions
on a single factor. Thus, one illuminating study of breast cancer patients
concluded that the leading "influence on decision-making behavior" was
"perceived salience." In other words, one aspect of the treatment determined
the whole decision. These patients "did not report conflict about what course
to take or the need for further information or deliberation."231 Schneider
observed "similarly truncated courses of decision" in prospective dialysis
patients. They listened "until they heard some arresting fact and then based
their decision on it. For instance, as soon as some patients hear that
hemodialysis requires inserting two large needles into an arm thrice weekly,
they opt for whatever the alternative is. When some other patients hear
peritoneal dialysis means having a tube protruding from their abdomen, they
choose 'the other kind of dialysis."' 232
Snap decisions are not confined to treatment choices; health plans seem
often to be similarly chosen. Consider this powerful a fortiori example.
Hibbard et al. say that even employers' health care specialists make decisions
poorly. "Half of the purchasers in our survey thought that it was difficult or
227
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very difficult to bring all of the variables together into a decision. "233 Only
about a fifth used "some kind of system for making trade-offs and identifying
high-performing, cost-effective plans," and the "system" could be as primitive
as a four-cell matrix. 234 "Twelve percent reported that they made their choices
on the basis of a single dimension such as cost or geographic access." 235
Purchasers depended on inferior information about hospital quality. They
used the best information (outcomes data) only about a quarter of the time it
was available, for example. 236 "Purchasers do not always understand the intent
of the quality indicators and do not always interpret them correctly."237 If this
is how professionals fare, what hope for us amateurs?
Again, this is characteristic of how people operate in other contexts. For
example, loan terms differ scarily, but "the basic rule of thumb for borrowing
seems to be: 'Can I afford the monthly payment?'" This simplifies choice, but
it obviates "any calculation or awareness of the cost of credit. It also obscures
any comparison between the cost of credit and the cost of paying ... out of
savings, and any comparison of competing credit offers. Most importantly, it
renders disclosure of APR and related credit terms interesting but
irrelevant. "238
Ultimately, what matters is whether patients can choose plans, providers,
and treatments with the combination of quality and cost that best suits them
and thus helps restrain medical costs. Can they? Consumerism sometimes
produces some of its intended effects in some ways in some measure. Patients
with less insurance and patients spending their own money behave differently
from patients spending insurance money. Fronstin and Collins report that 60
to 74 percent of people enrolled in consumerist plans strongly or somewhat
agreed that the terms of their health plans made them consider costs when
deciding to see a doctor when sick or fill a prescription. By comparison,
"fewer than half (47 percent) of those in more comprehensive plans felt this
way .... " Similarly, sixty percent of those enrolled in consumerist plans said
that they had checked whether their health plan would cover their costs prior
to receiving care, while 50 percent "of those in comprehensive plans had
checked whether their plans would cover care" and 21 percent had checked
the price of a service. 239 While this suggests that consumerism can change
people's behavior, it is far from showing that enough people "consider costs"
regularly enough and correctly enough to reduce costs significantly without
impairing patients' health.
But do patients economize undesirably? There is some encouraging news
on this front. Almost two decades ago, the RAND experiment found that
"reduced service use under the cost-sharing plans had little or no net adverse
effect on health for the average person ...."240 However, that experiment's
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deductibles were lower than the upper range of deductibles today (inflationadjusted, around $2500-3000). And crucially, "[h]ealth among the sick poor
- approximately the most disadvantaged 5 percent of the population - was
adversely affected .... "241
There is also disquieting evidence about how well patients negotiate
between underuse and wasteful use of medical care. For example, a recent
attempt "to assess whether CDHP enrollees are more likely to make costeffective, evidence-based care choices than those who are enrolled in a PPO"
similarly found "that enrollment in CDHPs resulted in a reduction of both
high-priority and low-priority care (cost-effective and less cost-effective
care)."242 Distinguishing between the two is difficult. Consider one kind of
under-use - postponing consultation with a doctor. People often do so
unwisely and expensively. "Over 30 percent of cancer patients ... postpone
seeking a diagnosis for three or more months after they first notice growths or
other symptoms that they know could be danger signs."243 Many people
having heart attacks delay calling a doctor for four or five hours because "the
decision making process gets jammed by the patient's inability to admit that
he is mortally sick. "244
Some of the problem is medical ignorance, but only some. For example,
people who know cancer's danger signs are likelier to postpone seeing a
physician than people who do not. 245 Cost deters some patients from seeking
care, but again this is not the whole story. Over one-third of the English
families with free health care had a member who was "suffering from pain or
discomfort but was not receiving medical treatment." 246 Much of the story is
fear, which can lead to seeking care both too aggressively and too timidly. As
one man ruefully wrote, "In full health, I imagine minor ailments to be
dangerous symptoms, or else, from fear, ignore them away. I do not submit
routinely to preventive medicine. What may it not show up?" 247
Most significantly, there is plentiful evidence that cost pressure on
patients can lead them to damaging economies. For example, "incentivebased formularies are associated with lower costs and smaller increases in
drug utilization and expenditures compared with control groups." However,
those formularies are also "associated with undesirable effects." Patients
confronted "with higher copayments are more likely to switch medications or
to discontinue medications entirely. Moreover, studies have found that cost
sharing may be followed by reductions in the use of 'essential' drugs, higher
rates of serious adverse events, and increased use of emergency department
visits and hospital days." 248
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One study of Medicare+Choice beneficiaries is typical and telling enough
to be described in block quotes:
[L]imits on drug benefits had consistently negative
consequences. Beneficiaries whose benefits were capped used
fewer prescription drugs overall and fewer drugs for the
treatment of chronic diseases than those whose benefits were not
capped. The differences in consumption between beneficiaries
with and those without caps on their benefits were substantially
larger during the months after the subjects exceeded the cap than
during earlier months .... Overall, subjects whose benefits were
capped had higher rates of non-elective hospitalizations, visits to
the emergency department, and death. In addition, subjects
whose benefits were capped had lower pharmacy costs but higher
hospital and emergency department costs, with no significant
difference in total medical costs between the two groups. 249
These findings were
consistent with those of previous survey-based studies. Nearly a
third of Medicare beneficiaries reported taking fewer drugs than
were prescribed in order to save money, and less generous drug
benefits were associated with lower rates of drug adherence. In
non-Medicare, low-income populations, drug limits increased
nursing home admissions. High patient cost-sharing levels in
Canada were associated with a lower rate of use of essential drugs
and higher rates of visits to the emergency department and
hospitalizations. The lack of any drug coverage has been
associated with poor outcomes. 250
Rice and Matsuoka summarize the literature similarly: "Nearly all of the
22 relevant studies examined that have been published since 1990 - 16
focusing on cost-sharing for prescription drugs and 6 on cost-sharing for
medical services - conclude that increased cost-sharing reduces either or both
the [appropriate] utilization and health status of seniors."251
Are these patients simply too poor to buy all the care they need? Or are
they economizing improvidently? Surely both. But given such hard decisions,
it would be surprising if the latter answer did not explain a good deal.
We have asked how well even knowledgeable consumers make decisions.
Contemporary scholarship finds a festival of ways people stumble in making
decisions. This is true, but it is easily misunderstood. So, three reminders.
First, we are not saying that nobody ever makes good decisions. We are saying
that people have trouble with unfamiliar and complex choices, like selecting
health plans, providers, and treatments.
Second, we are not implying that people's decisional reluctance justifies
usurping their decisional authority. On the contrary, we are evaluating a
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program - consumerism - intended to compel people to make decisions willynilly.
Third, consumerism, like the law of mandated disclosure generally, is
misled by its homo arbiter model of human nature. That model assumes that
people want to make all the decisions that affect their lives and that they will
be motivated and able to make those decisions well. Both assumptions
contain important truth and important misconceptions. Many people will
shrug off the burden consumerism would impose on them. We all have
trouble making many of those decisions well and with a good chance of
reaching results that serve our own goals. And that sets consumerism on an
uphill road.
VII. CONCLUSION

Of course, this is a somewhat vague conclusion. But in a question of
significance, of worth, like this, conclusions can never be precise. The
answer of appreciation, of sentiment, is always a more or a less, a
balance struck by sympathy, insight, and good will. But it is an
answer, all the same, a real conclusion. And in the course ofgetting it,
it seems to me that our eyes have been opened to many important
things.
William James
What Makes a Life Significant
A. CONSUMERS ON THE CLATTERING TRAIN

Consumerism inspires zeal in a few proponents 252 and hope in a few
quarters. To return to our clattering-train metaphor, consumerists want us
consumers in charge of the providers and insurers who seem to run the train.
We have not tried to evaluate consumerism globally, to survey every kind of
issue it raises. Rather, we have singled out one crucial question: What would
the consumer's world and the patient's life be like in a consumerist system?
Would people succeed at the tasks they would have to perform for
consumerism to subdue health care costs and to help patients get the care
they want?
We have answered those questions by identifYing consumerism's
The prerequisites are
prerequisites and asking if they can be met.
disconcertingly many. First, consumers must be offered the coverage,
caretakers, and care they need. Second, reliable information about those
choices must be available. Third, information must be put before consumers,
especially by doctors. Fourth, consumers must receive the information. Fifth,
the information must be adequately complete and comprehensible. Sixth,
252
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consumers must understand what they are told. Seventh, consumers must be
willing to analyze the information. Eighth, consumers must actually analyze
the information and do so well enough to make good choices.
Each prerequisite must be met; a failure at any stage can preclude
accurate decisions. Can all these prerequisites be met? Not reliably; they are
too numerous and too often too demanding.
Two kinds of evidence tended to confirm this conclusion. First, we
frequently have drawn parallels between consumerism and the legal device of
mandated disclosure. As we have seen, mandated disclosure has often
betrayed the hopes entertained for it. Second, consumerism rests on
misleading assumptions about human nature. People often resist proffers of
decisional authority, and they often stumble in making unfamiliar decisions.
This too dims the prospects of meeting consumerism's prerequisites.
When we recall our clattering train, the consumer's situation looks even
worse. The train is impelled by forces strong and many. Consumerism leaves
most of them unaltered. It directly addresses the moral-hazard problem, but
most other dynamics of the health care system remain unaffected. Insofar as
consumerism addresses those dynamics, it is by us all to manage them. This
task overwhelmed managed care. Like consumerism, managed care counted
on market forces. Will consumers fare better with those forces?
Partly, this depends on the politics of consumerism. For example,
consumerism needs the cooperation and even commitment of both employers
and employees. But a "recent study of employers' attitudes toward such
programs suggests some ambivalence on their part. They are uncertain about
the effect of such programs on costs and quality, and most significantly,
perhaps, whether such programs will in fact be popular with employees
253
••••"
The Community Tracking Study recently found "deep skepticism"
among a full range of market participants that consumerism can "produce
urgently needed improvements in the efficiency and quality of the nation's
health care system. As much as these predominantly private-sector leaders
dread the prospect of deeper interventions by government, few of them seem
to be able to imagine other alternatives. "254
Discouragement, distrust, and dislike are not conclusive, but they are
critical. First, the history of managed care teaches that a detested health
policy is a dead one. Managed care was less culpable than people thought and
deserves more esteem than it enjoys. Yet like St. Sebastian it twists in agony
as it is pierced from all sides with arrows. The revolt against managed care
was remarkable: legislation attacking particular cost-saving measures
(including so-called "drive-by deliveries"), 255 legislation prohibiting "gag-rules"
said to restrict what doctors could tell patients, 256 patients' "bills of rights,"
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legislation and litigation inhibiting managed care plans from excluding
doctors from their networks, legislation to "amend ERISA and permit patients
to sue their MCO and states to regulate managed care,"257 and so on. The
number, scope, stringency, and success of these attacks on managed care
suggest how powerfully doctors and patients can insist on the control over
medicine they have recently enjoyed, despite a consensus that health care
costs must be constrained.
To be sure, the public has itself (partly) to blame for consumerism and
may well have boxed itself into a consumerist corner. That public can't bear
government regulation of expenditures. It can't agree on universal health
care. It helped sabotage managed care. In other words, "as the 1990s' HMO
debate showed, [the public] wants fine health care benefits with no
bureaucratic cost-control measures to limit that care"258 but not to pay what
such benefits cost. So "[g]overnment, booed off the field, handed the ball to
market forces," Brown says dryly. Those forces did "what they are supposed to
do - squeeze waste, change payment systems, redefine necessary and
appropriate care, favor primary care, and the rest. Yet the general public and
special groups increasingly demand closer regulation of the new system," a
demand government is "ever more willing to meet." 259
This is all understandable; tout comprendre, beaucoup pardonner. Health
care organization, regulation, and finance are so Byzantine and baroque that a
sober and sophisticated political discussion of them is unimaginable. 26° Faced
with illness (their own or someone else's), people reflexively say damn the
price (especially since the price has so long been so obscured by insurance).
And the public has been incited to misunderstanding and indignation by
institutions less easily pardoned - particularly the medical establishment.
Organizations like the AMA have served their members' economic interests
and demands for professional autonomy by resisting managed care and other
promising attempts to control medical costs, not least physicians' fees. 261 And
doctors have shown as a profession that they exalt their guild interests at the
expense of their patients' welfare. 262 This matters because, as we have shown,
patients' spending usually is directed by doctors. If doctors do not wholeheartedly help patients economize, consumerism cannot cool health care costs
We have tested consumerism against its proponents' claims. Would
consumerism look better if those claims were moderated? Surely. First, any
plausible approach to American health care finance will use some consumerist
presented any "proof that any of these proVIsiOns are being enforced in a way that
systematically restricts communications between providers and patients." David A. Hyman,
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devices. Such devices already proliferate in the form of shared premiums, copayments, and deductibles.
Second, patients care about and can evaluate some aspects of care. In
particular, patients want respect and solicitude. 263 Prudent providers might
respond to consumerism by trying to accommodate them. "The healthcare
industry - as ironic as it may seem - has not functioned as a true customeroriented service industry. It is now seeking to shift models and to better
understand the phenomenon of patient satisfaction. "264 Some providers are
using "survey research methods to obtain customer (patient) feedback with
respect to service, process, and facilities. This is especially true within the
fastest growing sector associated with the family-centered practice."265
Third, at least consumerism brings some costs home to patients, however
clumsily. Could this at least help consumers realize that costs won't be
controlled until they get help persuading doctors to attack costs systematically
and until they accept a system that does not give them everything they
want? 266 People do realize now that, in various ways, health costs are a severe
problem. 267 Can consumerism help them see that better cost-control might be
possible with managed care run in the patients' interests? Can consumerism
induce them to apply enough political pressure for such a reform ?268 We
dearly hope so.
B. RICHER RICH AND POORER POOR

Consumerism embodies two of the central preoccupations of
contemporary health law and policy - controlling costs and extending
patients' authority over their care. We have shown that many unlikely things
have to happen for consumerism to achieve its advocates' expectations. But
there is another problem with consumerism. It fails to address the continuing
scandal of American health policy - the fact that almost 50 million people are
uninsured and at least as many are poorly insured 269 and that much evidence
shows "large health disparities between the disadvantaged in the United
263
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States and those who are more privileged ...."270 Worse, it moves in the
opposite direction; it benefits most those who least need help and most
disadvantages those most in need.
Of course it does. The prosperous do better in markets than the
impecunious. The poor, the illiterate, the elderly, the really sick, profit least
from consumerism, while to profit substantially, it helps to be well off, well
educated, and healthy. For example, the federal government's way of
promoting consumerism specially benefits the wealthy, healthy, and childless:
Health savings accounts are tax-advantaged, but that is useless to people with
modest income. HSAs can accumulate from year to year, but the sick and
families with children rapidly spend each year's allotment. And consumerism
leaves to their fates the unemployed and the under-insured. Even people
whose employers provide good insurance often struggle with high deductibles.
Many of them are economically marginal and barely make it from paycheck to
paycheck. 271 But what are high deductibles to wealthier patients? 272
Consumerism's favors are for the well off in another way. Like mandated
disclosure generally, it serves "the well educated and well situated far more
than the illiterate and poor. Disclosures are more useful to the former than
the latter because the former are better able to understand them and
understand how to use them."273 Consumerism puts a premium on fending for
yourself and negotiating for the best deal. The well-off have experience and
resources to do so that the badly off lack. This can be true even where
attempts have been made to simplifY information. For example, "Peters and
colleagues found that using a traffic light symbol helped highly numerate
consumers select better-quality hospitals. However, it reduced the ability of
less numerate consumers to select the best-quality hospital. "274
For example, "functional health literacy was worse among the elderly and
individuals who reported poor overall health. Thus, groups with the highest
prevalence of chronic disease and the greatest need for health care had the
least ability to read and comprehend information needed to function as a
patient."275 There were "striking differences between the Medicare and the
younger sample in ability to use information accurately.
Medicare
beneficiaries made almost three times as many errors as the younger
respondents did (25 percent versus 9 percent) . . . ."276 People in "poorer
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health" and people "with less education" also "tended to make more errors."277
The people who understood Medicare information least were also the people
most likely to want to delegate decisions and to see "more information and
options as unwelcome burdens. "278 In another study, the people who knew the
least about Medicare choices "were older, had lower incomes, lower education,
more nights in the hospital, and fewer doctor's office visits."279 Similarly, '1ess
than half of the uninsured (48%) - or about 18 million people - use or are
aware of a safety net provider in their community," suggesting "that many
uninsured people do not know of an affordable source of care to turn to when
they need medical attention."280 Yet "the least educated users of health care
often have the greatest health needs and are vulnerable both to risk-selection
in insurance and to substandard provision of care."281
As we have seen, the problem is not just in understanding; it is in results.
For example, in the Rand experiment the poorest people were the worst
affected by consumerism. And as a more recent study reports, consumerism's
"impact on utilization appears to be strongest for those with less education
and income (hourly workers). That is, the observed effect is more prominent
for those who have fewer resources. This suggests that the CDHP approach to
cost sharing may further disadvantage those who are already less
advantaged."282 Likewise, "[c]ost-sharing is perhaps the most studied aspect
of the Medicaid program: a plethora of research concludes that even modest
co-payments ... cause Medicaid patients to forego necessary, not just excess,
medical care."283 This is consistent with long experience. For instance,
"prevention efforts often attract those who least need them and fail to reach
those most disadvantaged."284
Thus we come to a final observation. We are grateful to live in a market
economy. We cherish the market's ability to provide- so often- good things
at good prices. If consumerism could deliver what its apostles promise, we
would cheer. Any successful health care system will use market devices. 285
But when a resource so basic to human well-being - to human life - is so
scarce for so many people, we need to think more broadly about our social
responsibilities. The attempt to give individuals more control over their
health care - whether through the market or through various mandated
disclosures - has its moral merits. But it has come to dominate the ethics and
law of health care to the detriment of a decent sense of our responsibilities to
m
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our fellow citizens. "By its emphasis on choice, its eschewing of visions of the
common good (much less social solidarity), and its focus on individual
preferences as the (almost) final arbiter of political acceptability,"286
consumerism shares the moral failing of much contemporary health policy. It
speaks powerfully to the claims we make for ourselves but barely whispers
about the claims others make on us.
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